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Abstract

Since 9/11 this country has been faced with a problem unforeseen prior to the tragic
events in 2001: terrorist threats and attacks against the United States. Just a decade later,
we are facing complex issues regarding the protection of this nation‘s most critical assets.
Ordinary Americans depend on banking, public transportation, highways, and other
infrastructures to maintain a healthy living. The protection of these assets is conducive to
how we sustain freedom and prosperity in America. Addressed in this project are several
topics analyzing the safety and security of critical infrastructures including banking and
finance, maritime areas, rail way systems, and the critical infrastructures for the U.S.
Department of Defense are used as primary examples. In addition to these topics, the
issue of human rights, the USA Patriot Act, and military tribunals are included, as well as
intelligence assessments against the New York City subway system.

Chapter I contains a report to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Janet Napolitano, laying out the need to increase and enhance security measures
for the nation‘s infrastructures, in this case, seaport security. This gives a broader view on
how government agencies of all levels must sustain healthy relationships with private
stakeholders and international organizations. As the world becomes smaller with
technology, we have to become mindful of how one act of terrorism could be detrimental
to not only America but to the global economy.
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CHAPTER I

The United States Department of Homeland Security:

A Strategy to Enhance Safer Ports Through
The International United Reliance Program
TO: Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
FROM: Rebecca Sidhu
SUBJECT: Recommendation to Improve Seaport Security

Strategic Recommendation on Seaport Security
The nation‘s current seaport security is woefully inadequate for the 21st century. This
memorandum is a strategy to improve the nation‘s homeland security and particularly its
seaport security. It encourages increased and coordinated efforts abroad to ensure greater
seaport cargo security at home.
For nations most susceptible to these dangers, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) should consider implementing a new program which I call the International
United Reliance Program (IURP). The IURP will be a newly developed area in which
the U.S. will have face to face interactions with foreign government officials and their
front line security forces. Through diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts via the
Department of Defense (DOD) security forces, the U.S. will be doing more than just
requesting help; the DHS will have established relationships with countries essential to
securing their own seaports, and in essence, preventing weapons of mass destruction
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(WMD) and other chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weaponry (CBRN)
from being sent to the U.S.
Charles Goslin, Vice President of Duo Industries, reported that in November 2002, Abd
al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Al Qaida‘s operations chief in the Persian Gulf developed a strategy
to attack Western shipping targets:
1. Ramming vulnerable vessels at sea;
2. Blowing up medium-sized vessels at ports;
3. Attacking vulnerable, large cargo ships such as super tankers from the air
by using explosive-laden small aircraft.

This intelligence is supported by the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and the 2010
Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate. In addition, Al Qaida operatives have obtained
international seamen‘s licenses, nonimmigrant visas, and other documentation that enable
international port access. The implications of the aforementioned open-source
intelligence (OSINT) include enhanced international port security.

Vulnerabilities
High risk countries including Yemen, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,
and India are prone to extremism; the same types of threats and ideals of extremism now
threaten our country. International shipping is an object of threat that is greater in
certain countries. The aforementioned countries are more susceptible to these threats
because of the greater presence of terrorist cells which operate these areas. With vast
amounts of imported goods entering the ports, it makes it difficult for the U.S. to search
every package entering our ports.
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Christopher Bellavita‘s Homeland Security Affairs: What Is Preventing Homeland
Security? addresses an interesting point, ―At the national level, there have been no
especially imaginative innovations in policy, strategy or how we are organized to prevent
terrorism.‖ If the theory that we are ―secure‖ at a national level by simply placing new
goals and strategies, then we will start to see issues come about as terrorism gets more
technically advanced and communication starts to deteriorate amongst U.S. agencies.
The idea that if we write down goals and objectives and assume they will be applied
correctly across the board with all DHS agencies is a misconception which is a recipe for
disaster.
The DHS must analyze what the U.S. is encountering and the resources seaports lack. If
we narrow down our efforts to a local level, we will be able to get a better idea of how
operations affect the nation on an international level. For example, the main purpose for
the coordinated effort between The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA)
and the DHS is to increase security by scanning shipments which arrive by ships. While
the PA and other DHS personnel are trained to deal with possible scenarios, the DHS has
not implemented supply-chain accountability that might identify and trace all transported
goods from port of origin to the receiving port.

The PA and DHS do not have a balanced cargo to security personnel ratio. C. Goslin
(2007) explains: ―Globally, there are very few uniform standards for point-to-point
control of security on containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port‘s security in one
nation remains very much at the mercy of a port‘s security, or lack thereof, in another
nation. Organized crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority of seaports still
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do not require background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse
employees. Most ports lease large portions of their facility to private terminal operating
companies, who are responsible for their own security.‖

RAND indicates that a container arriving at a U.S. port is subjected to several checks.
―The 24-hour advanced manifest rule requires carriers to submit manifest information 24
hours before cargo is loaded onto a U.S. bound vessel. In this time, CBP performs a
background screen on the manifest, carrier and shipper to determine if the shipment poses
a risk to the United States. In some cases, the container is denied permission to be loaded
on the vessel.‖ Stephen Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and retired
U.S. Coast Guard commander stated ―It takes one of their customers saying, ‗Hey I‘ve
got one of your boxes if you want it back.' Those boxes are a potentially potent weapon
for terrorists – whether for use smuggling weapons, explosive materials or terrorists
themselves, or as a huge chemical, biological or ‗dirty‘ bomb spreading radioactive
waste. At present, though, many ports are ill-prepared to deal with that threat.‖ (Shoen,
2004) ―And while advanced technology scanners have helped speed those inspections,
just tracking the 200 million containers that move among the world‘s top seaports each
year is a major undertaking.‖(Schoen, 2004) Companies do not know where 40 percent
of these shipments are at any given time.

Current DHS Strategic Goals as They Relate to Seaport Security

The DHS has implemented five strategic goals and four objectives in the National
Strategy for Homeland Security. One of these goals is to ―Protect Our Nation from
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Dangerous Goods.‖ The mission is: ―We will lead the unified national effort to secure
America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to
threats and hazards to the nation. We will secure our national borders while welcoming
lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.‖ This is according to the DHS five year strategic
plan titled ―One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland.‖ We have to increase
seaport security of the United States and other countries by increasing the effectiveness
of how we communicate with security forces abroad. Brian Jackson and David
Frelinger‘s Emerging Threats and Security Planning (2009) frame a middle ground
approach to addressing possible threats. Meeting halfway in a proposal rather than
burdening a country with its own security forces is essential. ―Ideally, the national
approach to addressing possible future threats should strive to get as many of the
advantages of both ends of the spectrum—responding prudently to threats…but not
allowing doing so to threaten the effectiveness and sustainability of existing security
efforts by forcing planners to spend disproportionate time focusing on unlikely terrorist
scenarios. Analysts could use techniques such as risk analysis or cost/benefit analysis to
assess different threats and use their results as a common denominator to determine how
much we should worry about different possible attacks and the advisability of different
possible responses to them‖ (B. Jackson & D. Frelinger, 2009).
The DHS‘ National Strategy provides four objectives.
1.

To prevent and detect radiological/nuclear attacks. To reduce the risk of
nuclear and radiological attacks the DHS intends to ―develop and
implement measures aimed at preventing successful introduction of
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nuclear and radiological weapons into the United States, whether by air,
land, or sea.‖
2.

To prevent, detect, and protect against biological attacks. The DHS will
lead efforts to establish an integrated National Bio-defense
Architecture. ―We will systematically prioritize and focus efforts,
including risk-based threat assessments, biological detectors, biosurveillance, forensics, and emergency planning systems that can
quickly detect, characterize, and respond to biological attack. We will
prepare individuals, families, communities, and the nation to respond
effectively to biological attacks in the United States and minimize
consequences.‖

3.

To prevent and detect chemical and explosive attacks. We will reduce
the risk of and guard against chemical and explosive attacks in the
United States. The DHS goes on to say that they will ―reduce the risks
to our citizens and infrastructure from hazardous chemical and
explosive attacks and incidents.‖

4.

To prevent the introduction of illicit contraband while facilitating trade.
The DHS ―will guard against unlawful goods and activities entering the
United States with minimal impact to legitimate trade.‖

The Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) addresses twenty four directives
to combat terrorism. Six directives state how to increase security at a national level
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rather than an international level. HSPD 1 created the Homeland Security Council (HSC)
and specifies its organization. After President Obama was elected, he combined the HSC
into the National Security Council.
1. Directive 3 dated March 11, 2002 states the HSPD for the Homeland Security
Advisory System: ―to inform all levels of government and local authority, as well
as the public, to the current risk of terrorist attacks.‖ This is related to seaport
security in that we have established joint efforts with local, federal and private
entities to ensure seaport security.
2. Directive 4 dated September 17, 2002, states the HSPD for National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction: ―Set forth a comprehensive strategy to
counter the WMD threat in all of its dimensions.‖ We have to relate this to every
element of homeland security including seaport security. WMD are a concern
requiring further security checks via better relationship with foreign security
forces.
3. Directive 6 dated September 16, 2003, states the HSPD for the Integration and
Use of Screening Information: ―the policy is to develop, integrate, and maintain
thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals known or
appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct related to
terrorism. The directive will be implemented in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, including those protecting the
rights of all Americans.‖ This seaport security strategy is to foil an attack before
it makes its way through our seaports.
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4. Directive 7 dated December 17, 2003, states the HSPD for the Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection: ―establishes a national
policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United
States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
attacks, and to work with state and local governments and the private sector to
accomplish this objective.‖ Infrastructure is a crucial part of seaport security. We
will have to implement the strategy to provide for better communication efforts.
5. Directive 10 dated April 28, 2004, states the HSPD for Biodefense for the 21st
century: ―The pillars of this national biodefense program are Threat Awareness,
Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and
Recovery. A classified version of this directive contains specific direction to
departments and agencies.‖ The strategy will be built upon this directive. It is
important to put into practice a method to better develop seaport intelligence.
6. Directive 19 dated February 12, 2007, states the HSPD for Combating Terrorism
Use of Explosives in the United States: ―establishes a national policy, and calls
for the development of a national strategy and implementation plan, on the
prevention and detection of, protection against, and response to terrorist use of
explosives in the United States.‖ The subject of explosives needs to be heavily
scrutinized. Although not all measures are a 100% preventative measure we can
certainly tighten the strategies already in place and place further security efforts
via this strategy.
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These objectives are to be implemented or increased by at least 80% by 2013. These
objectives are realistic but not easily applied when lacking the appropriate resources. The
recommendation below will improve seaport, homeland, and national security.

Recommendation One:

DHS should widen the scope of detection and inspection of cargo shipments entering the
United States.

DHS should leverage current diplomatic and peacekeeping policies to affirm that
the IURP could provide for the safety and security of the host country and the
international shipping community.
DHS should facilitate port-specific information and intelligence sharing initiatives
with International Maritime Organization signatory nations.
DHS should prioritize seaport-MOU protocols with state and local governments and
private sector entities to facilitate point-to-point tracking capabilities.
The IURP contains outreach programs which identify not only the safety concerns for the
U.S. but for other countries also. Conversely, the United States must acknowledge that
foreign governmental agencies may not be quick to disseminate information pursuant to a
treaty. We should not assume countries will handle treaties the same way. Some
countries may not decide to be cooperative, while others may simply feel that the
situation is not grave enough to involve the United States. Among the vast amount of
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information sharing that goes on between the U.S. and other countries, DHS will have to
stand out this issue.

Recommendation Two: Enforce extant IMO Regulations

The U.S. might have to pressure some countries to comply with this strategy. We need to
know how to urge them into cooperating. A simple example is that of a door-to-door
salesman. No one wants to answer the door because they know someone wants to sell a
product. They see this person going around from house to house asking residents if they
are interested in investing their time, energy, and money in a product. Rather than
marketing an item they are asking a person to buy something by intruding into their
space. However, if the salesman took a marketing approach, it would be more
compelling. He or she would invite potential investors to his or her place of business and
give a sense of welcoming to the investor, making the investor feel comfortable and
offering incentives. To market an idea to a country rather than selling an idea are two
different approaches. Clearly one works better than the other; the DHS needs to take the
approach as a marketer. In a marketing aspect there is a give and take, there must be an
advantage to the investing country. While the U.S. is interested in foreign port security,
the port of origin also has a vested interest. If the U.S. simply refused to accept goods
from ports that do not comply with U.S. and International Organization treaties, we may
see cooperation and a willingness to participate in our agenda.
The IMO‘s strategic plan dated January 18, 2010 addresses the concerns for seaport
security and the challenges they face. ―The challenge for IMO is to promote the effective
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implementation of the security measures, and to instill a security consciousness in ship
and port facility operations, at the same time ensuring that the right balance is struck in
trade facilitation and that the flow of seaborne trade continues to be smooth and
efficient.‖ Furthermore, Section 2.9 of the Strategic Plan states, “The Integrated
Technical Co-operation Programme (ITCP) is crucial for assisting developing countries
to implement IMO instruments for safer and more secure shipping, enhanced
environmental protection and facilitation of international maritime traffic. In addition, the
ITCP makes a contribution to assisting developing countries to achieve relevant
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The importance of the ITCP increases further
with amendments to existing instruments and developing new ones. in which the
particular needs of, and impact on, small states and least developed countries should be
taken into account. There are concerns about IMO‘s capacity to meet the historical and
growing needs of developing countries for technical assistance and, in particular, about
the long-term financial sustainability of the ITCP.‖ The challenge that faces the IMO is
funding for these countries and the joint effort the U.S. trying to implement with these
foreign entities.

This burden will have to fall on the U.S., particularly the agencies within DHS. There
will have to be a determination of the cost/benefit analysis, and a determination of the
source of dangerous shipments. At a minimum, it would cost any country millions of
dollars to implement such a strategy. To operate additional personnel and security
measures, funding will be the main concern. There are two ways in which the IURP can
be implemented without placing 100% of the burden on a country. The first is to supply

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 16 -

the funding for these countries to hire the personnel and to purchase necessary equipment
necessary to carry out the IURP. The second is to provide the military support and
contractors to add to personnel.
The model for more secure ports lies with the help of vulnerable countries from which
dangerous goods may be shipped; it is best to keep in mind that given the vast amount of
shipments that come from all around the world, the DHS will be able to focus on
shipments on a broader scale, giving attention to those shipments which have been
deemed to be hazardous.

Recommendation Three: The DHS coordinates with other federal agencies involved with
international security.

The DHS should build upon its relationship with DOD to increase foreign port security.
The DOD seeks to prevent warfare by approaching a strategy with the idea that ―The best
way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful
change within the international system.‖ (National Defense Strategy, Department of
Defense). DOD‘s strategy is to build upon a broad base along with partners to establish
long-term security. An example is that of the Afghanistan troop force working alongside
Americans so they are better trained and equipped to defend a nation. The DOD also
emphasizes the importance of strengthening the ―resiliency of the international system to
deal with conflict when it occurs. We must be prepared to deal with sudden disruptions,
to help prevent them from escalating or endangering international security, and to find
ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion.‖ The IURP has the same ideals, to establish
long term alliances in order to protect dangerous good from entering U.S. soil.
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Conclusion
Michael Sheehan, former New York City Deputy Commissioner for Counterrorism,
suggested that whatever is going on in our seaports, ―echoes the well-known problem in
our airports. Just as commercial aviation is tightly managed while commercial contract
air is full of holes, so too are our ports, containerized shipping [is] carefully scrutinized
(most of the time) while the rest of our maritime traffic is given an all access pass.‖
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Coast Guard, and Customs Border Patrol
should designate roles to separate divisions who are solely responsible for running the
operations of the IURP, thus creating fewer burdens on the Department as a whole.
There must be movement to ensure the safety of our ports by logistically implementing
the IURP on both security levels on as a business relationship level. Sheehan stated that
he was shocked to learn while at the NYPD ―how little of that was being done, and how
business around our ports relevant to intelligence hadn‘t significantly changed since
9/11.‖
The IURP is an attempt to increase port security abroad in order to increase security at
home, not only for the benefit for the U.S. but also for other countries as well. We cannot
simply set goals and objectives and expect them to be followed by other nations. The
IURP is a proactive approach to consistent security measures. The U.S. must take
measures to ensure that more than just two percent of cargo is being inspected.
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CHAPTER II
The United States Department of Homeland Security:
The International United Reliance Program from A Managerial Standpoint
Nature of the United States Department of Homeland Security
Eleven days after the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush implemented the
Office of Homeland Security. What once used to be 40 separate agencies in separate
departments were combined by the Office of Homeland Security into the 22 agencies of
the Department of Homeland Security.
In ―A Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security,‖ President
Bush addressed the nation and proposed the creation of a permanent Cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security to unite essential agencies charged with protecting the
homeland. Outlined are four missions corresponding to four proposed divisions in the
department. (See Figure 2.2)

2.2: Missions Corresponding to Four Proposed Divisions (Borja, 2008)
Border and Transportation Security
Emergency Preparedness and Response

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Countermeasures

Information Analysis and Infrastructure

Control the borders and prevent terrorists
and explosives from entering the country.
Work with state and local authorities to
respond quickly and effectively to
emergencies.
Bring together the country’s best scientists
to develop technologies that detect
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons
to best protect citizens.
Review intelligence and law enforcement
information from all agencies of
government, and produce a single daily
picture of threats against the homeland.
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The nature of the DHS is extremely complex which requires the coordination,
intelligence, and communications of twenty two agencies. The integration of the
International United Reliance Program (IURP) in the DHS is one which must be done by
all agencies. This strategy is designed to increase global security throughout
international air and cargo ports in an attempt to prevent WMD and dangerous chemicals
from entering U.S. ports; these often are unchecked, leaving our country vulnerable. Thus
the IURP is not unique to one agency or organization. This strategy is one that the DHS
will be able to use in conjunction with the PA, our military forces, and international
security forces.

A Homeland Security Strategy and Key Management Principles
The International United Reliance Program (IURP) is a strategy that focuses on the
implementation of broader global security through international ports. In recent years we
have seen studies linked to terrorism and the lack of screening of U.S. ports. Particularly,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Strategic Plan has estimated a forecasted
increase in demand for Port Authority Transportation from 2005 to 2020 of 100% for port
cargo, and 70% for air cargo. The Port Authority (PA) has set priorities for measuring
success in establishing proper accommodations for the increase. ―Regional cost benefit
analysis, along with other decision-making tools such as risk assessment, life-cycle asset
management, and financial tests will allow the agency to pursue projects that meet six

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 22 -

primary organization goals.‖ They are: economic value, financial capacity, value to
customers, stewardship, leadership, and organizational excellence (See Figure 2.1).

2.1: PA‘s six primary goals (The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Strategic
Plan)
economic value

To maximize the region‘s economic
opportunities, productivity, and quality of life
through investments in transportation

financial capacity

To create and maintain the financial capacity
necessary to undertake the projects that will
significantly benefit the economy of the region

value to customers

To significantly improve the customer‘s daily
experience with the region‘s transportation
network

stewardship

To protect and sustain our facilities for
generations

leadership

To develop and implement the vision of this plan
through partnerships with public and private
entities

organizational excellence

To create an organization that excels in its
objective of making optimal policy and
investment decisions and implementing them
effectively

All of the PA goals are related to security measures that DHS intends will keep weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and other dangerous chemicals from entering the U.S.
without hindering international business relations. Global security without impacting
international commerce presents a myriad of management difficulties the DHS may
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encounter in implementing safer ports through the IURP. The IURP is a proposed
strategy by which the U.S. will have face to face interactions with not only foreign
government officials but also with their front line security forces. The U.S. will be doing
more than just requesting help; the DHS will have established personal contact with those
who are important in securing their own ports and preventing WMD and chemical being
shipped to the U.S. They will use a wide spectrum of management models.
Where Issues Lie Prior to Implementing the IURP and How We Address Them
Currently, treaties between the United States and other countries rely on how well we
develop the relationships to these countries in order to ensure that treaties are continually
followed. The same can be said for the IURP. In order to ensure safer ports at home we
have to ensure shipments from abroad are scanned and/or checked prior to their
departure. Jeff Conklin, in Dialog Mapping, discusses ―forces of fragmentation.‖ Forces
of fragmentation ―suggests a condition in which the people involved see themselves as
more separate than united, and in which information and knowledge are chaotic and
scattered.‖ He writes that the solution to this problem is to have a shared understanding
with the same commitments. There are two types of fragmentations which may
contribute to communication errors internationally. The first is wicked problems.
Extremely common, these problems are usually inevitable in any work setting; they
persist due to applying inappropriate methods and tools to solving these problems. If we
do not understand problems that persist we cannot simply apply any method in attempt to
solve these issues; the key is to first identify the problem and find the appropriate method
which can be applied. The second is social complexity. Depending the number of
parties, individuals and agencies involved, the more socially complex it is to
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communicate with one another. For instance, if we are dealing with a security forces and
foreign government agencies in the Middle East there is first a language barrier and
second culture barrier (Conklin, 2005).
Dealing with complexities on an international level, the DHS will be to be prepared for
seeing this fragmentation. In terms of implementing a strategy or method we also have to
take into consideration another fragmentation, and that is technical complexity.
Specifically, it ―raises the risk of project failure, it is also the most well recognized
fragmenting force. . . .Dialogue Mapping is [used] to provide an approach and set of tools
for dealing with the nontechnical side of fragmentation‖ (Conklin, 2005). Dialogue
Mapping is extremely important when dealing with the nontechnical complexities
because it addresses the problem but allows a diverse group of people (in this case
countries) to apply coherence around these problems. Coherence is defined as ―shared
meaning for key terms and concepts, that participants are clear about their role in the
effort, that together they have shared understanding of the background for the project and
what the issues are, and that they have a shared commitment to how the project will reach
its objectives and achieve success‖ (Conklin, 2005).
Risk Management and Improving Strategic Managerial Thinking
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) testifies before the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
Security Committee, and House of Representatives. It addresses several issues regarding
management and the assessment of implementing current and new strategies. We must
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recognize that there is a risk assessment involved and the GAO is an example of how we
need to implement strategies to secure United States ports.
We must implement certain managerial techniques which encourage partnerships across
the board not only with agencies within the DHS but with foreign government agencies in
countries which are vulnerable to terrorist activity. We have to address issues such as the
importance of securing the ports on an international level to maintain a higher degree of
security. Furthermore we must assess fiscal issues that come along with international
relations.
Norman Rabkin , the Managing Director who testified before the subcommittee,
addressed the integration of risk management principles into public sector operations. In
this integration, Rabkin describes how ―the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
developed and implemented a risk assessment program that guided the agency‘s
management in setting priorities for a 5-year, $500 million security capital investment
program. This methodology has since been applied to over 30 transportation and port
agencies across the country, and the Port Authority has moved from conducting
individual risk assessments to implementing an ongoing program of risk management.‖
This is an example of fiscally managing risk with ports in the northeast and across the
country. However the challenge still remains on how to integrate this strategy on an
international level. Improving communication and partnerships abroad is a still a
difficult task as it involved language and cultural barriers. With resources not readily
available, this presents key challenges to implementing safety measures. ―Technical
issues such as the difficult but necessary task of analyzing threat, vulnerability, and the
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consequences of a terrorist attack in order to assess and measure risk reduction; and
partnership and coordination challenge‖ still remains a challenge for the DHS (Rabkin,
2008).
Key risk assessment and management can be learned from examples from the private
sectors. Partnerships are important more than ever with the increase of terrorist activity.
Naming representatives from agencies across the board as a committee can help in
developing better coordination and partnership relations.
Rabkin addressed how participants surveyed on risk management felt that it was
―fragmented within and across the federal government. . . government wide guidance
should be developed.‖ A government policy which addresses all federal agencies is a
sufficient way to reduce overlapping of management and conflicting views from
individual agencies.
What Management Must Focus on Daily
There are several managerial principles for the IURP. First, management is dealing with
an agency within the DHS, the PA, and private security forces. The question here is how
do all these sectors of management work together to ensure employees are operating to
their fullest potential without jeopardizing the effectiveness and security of our ports.
One of the main issues the PA deals with is congestion. ―Critical needs that affect the
efficiency of maintaining and operating the system as well as the quality of service [are]
efficiency, sound stewardship, and prudent fiscal management, but replacement requires
a more intensive capital outlay in the immediate years and thus has been deferred‖ (The
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Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Strategic Plan). They also address congestion
and the hazards it may cause on international trade. Management must ensure that
congestion does not hinder the IURP‘s focus. Instead, we must use different managerial
strategies to ensure that there no unnecessary setbacks during this coordination.
Daily managerial strategies which can be used throughout the DHS, the PA, and private
sector security personnel can be compared to those listed in Strategy Under Uncertainty
by Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie. In this strategy the writers show
how businesses are able to accurately predict future events by capturing a cash-flow
analysis. Under this analysis there are four levels of uncertainty: 1) A clear enough
future where managers use market research, competitor costs, value chain analysis to
determine predictions, 2) Alternative futures which does not clearly make a prediction;
however, it can establish probabilities in which outcomes may change based on a
development of scenarios, 3) A range of futures where one scenario may lead to an
outcome or another scenario, 4) True ambiguity for which managers record what they
know in a scenario and what may be known about that scenario and thus arrive at
different outcomes. However, when dealing with international countries, scenarios are
not always predictable; we must always be ready for possible alternative outcomes and
sudden disasters. However, implementing such strategies may increase the creativity
levels allowing management to find factors to mitigate this disaster (Courtney, Kirkland,
Viguerie, 1997).
The third strategy is most pertinent to the IURP. First, DHS managers among the
involved agencies will have to involve employees to ―identify the nature and extent of
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residual certainties,‖ specifically, collecting intelligence, potential timelines for worst
case scenario possibilities, and which country may be vulnerable to sending unchecked
shipments to the U.S. Second, they must ―choose a strategic posture‖ which would
involve allowing security forces abroad and U.S. law enforcement officers to conduct
security checks and verifications without hindering international commerce. Third,
managers must ―build a portfolio of actions.‖ If for any reason scenarios and outcomes
of these scenarios are likely, then we must ensure that the right supplies and
communication plans are in place so we are able to prevent or mitigate such scenarios.
Finally, managers much ―actively manage the strategy‖ by monitoring overseas
communication and oversight of shipments departing for the U.S.; daily briefs to upper
management are necessary in order to continually keep communication flowing, and
employees must review daily memos to ensure they are aware of alerts (Courtney,
Kirkland, Viguerie, 1997).
To communicate effectively under extreme circumstances it is important consider daily
precautions to ensure measures are taken to address possible terrorist strikes. The
dissemination of information among the DHS, the PA, private security enforcement, and
through the IURP with other countries is an attempt to increase security and intelligence
gathering.
In the event of a catastrophic event, management will have to mitigate the chaos using the
information gathered from aforementioned strategies. For example, in the midst of a
terrorist attack the DHS and other law enforcement agencies will be involved with first
responders to keep ground zero in as much control as possible. However, this not the
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only important factor; we also have to discover where these attacks were planned, how
they were able to gather the material necessary to carry out an attack, and which
individuals or extremist groups are involved. There will have to be step by step actions
by the DHS to ensure that both air cargo and shipping ports are secure. The first step is
to be in contact with the PA to ensure that all ports are on heightened security. The
second is to ensure consistent communication with other countries abroad so that frequent
and up to date information is disseminated.

The third is to provide for security at these

ports by sending Coast Guards and other law enforcement personnel to ports to secure the
parameters and conduct immediate investigations into any suspicious activities.
William Pelfrey in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management wrote
on The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework for Terrorist Threats (2005).
He identifies one of the major difficulties in preparing for a disaster is the analysis and
assessments of an event that has not occurred yet or may never occur. In figure 2.3
Pelfrey models a strategic diagram in which the major elements of preparedness occurs as
a cycle. This cycle is the process by which ―agencies, organizations, jurisdictions, and
the nation, can become central‖ (Pelfrey, 2005). This considers preparedness techniques
for dealing with WMD‘s and terrorist activities.
Figure 2.3: Major elements of the Cycle of Preparedness (Pelfrey, 2005)
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Group Dynamics and Individualities of Personnel: Addressing Strengths and Weaknesses

In today‘s fast paced society, the world has seen an increase of technology,
communication, and population. The world has become much smaller due to technology
and with that comes competing industries. Because employees are aware that they may
be easily replaced, it is not unusual to find some feeling they are not contributing.
Although bonuses are a motivating factor, aside from monetary rewards, there are other
ways to motivate employees.
Stephen Robbins and Dave DeCenzo, authors of Fundamentals of Management (2008)
discuss the concept behind employee recognition. Applying such concepts to
government employees is important; managers must know in what area every employee
is able to contribute, specifically, how to recognize these achievements and how to
reward them. Robbins and DeCenzo developed the Big Five Model of Personality:
extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to
experience.
We must recognize that not everyone performs at the same caliber. How one may go
about bringing results or a solution to a problem may not be the same way another person
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may handle the situation. The way we perceive and go about handling a situation are
different depending on the situation and the person involved in solving the problem.
Robbins and DeCenzo write, ―By recognizing that people approach problem solving,
decision making, and job interactions differently, a manager can better understand why,
for instance, an employee is uncomfortable with making quick decisions or why an
employee insists on gathering as much information as possible before addressing a
problem.‖ If we simply take the time to analyze one‘s work performance, we will be able
to find a unique trait in each individual that can contribute to the success of an agency.
Disagreements or different perceptions of an individual could present issues in
management, turning it into a blame game. A manager would need to avoid that and
focus on the situation as a whole. Especially when dealing with government agencies
(specifically the DHS), we have to make fast decisions; problems will happen but will
have to be resolved quickly without hindering an investigation. Robbin‘s fundamental
attribution error is that judgments can be easily made and may be seen as poor work
progress.
Recognition need not be monetary, but perhaps a quick office wide email on success on a
case or report. Management can encourage employees to work together on projects
which may have been successful in the past. It is best not to judge, but rather give
constructive criticism so an employee‘s performance is better next time. A good way to
recognize one‘s work is through governmental appraisals. Tracking an employee‘s
record for the fiscal year is an effective way to acknowledge how each employee
contributed to specific duties and responsibilities.
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Group problem solving versus individual problem solving is what some would consider a
debate among agencies. From a management point of view, groups may be the dominant
route. Dealing with the DHS, one can only imagine what type of tug of wars agencies
encounter when dealing with a problem.
William Huitt, author of the article ―Problem solving and decision making: Consideration
of individual differences using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,‖ (1992) discusses the
research on personality and cognitive styles that is particular to each individual‘s problem
solving approach. He writes ―Most models of problem solving and decision making
include at least four phases, 1) an Input phase in which a problem is perceived and an
attempt is made to understand the situation or problem; 2) a Processing phase in which
alternatives are generated and evaluated and a solution is selected; 3) an Output phase
which includes planning for and implementing the solution; and 4) a Review phase in
which the solution is evaluated and modifications are made, if necessary. Most
researchers describe the problem-solving/decision-making process as beginning with the
perception of a gap and ending with the implementation and evaluation of a solution to
fill that gap.‖

Huitt goes on to address how individual differences may have implications on group
solving decisions. It is important to address these issues before allowing situations to get
out of hand as a manager. Each employee must recognize the situation and act
accordingly. ―Individual differences in problem-solving and decision making must be
considered to adequately understand the dynamics in problem solving and decision
making. . . .Attention must be paid to both the problem-solving process and the specific

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 33 -

techniques associated with important personal characteristics‖ (Huitt, 1992). All this is
very true, but when dealing with more than one agency, it would be hard to pay attention
to each individual‘s way of solving problems.

In times of disaster how do managers get employees to react under pressing situations?
A manager in the DHS must know individual personality traits for managing and solving
problems. If we have someone that‘s an extrovert and someone who is perceptive and
another who is intuitive, this can lead to better results. Each group working with
different personalities can work together while bringing their individualities to the table.

It is up to management to understand personality clashes and dismantle any hostility
during chaos. Just as in the private sector, project managers can be extremely beneficial
in dividing up group solving issues to each individual. It is not fair for one to be
perceived as having a better solution than the other as it may create some kind of
undermining judgment towards the others, especially if managers keep picking those
same individuals to solve a problem.

Every problem has a different solution. Every solution, however, should include a group
effort. While one might outshine the other, it may be simply because that person‘s way
of coming up with a solution reflects their own personality trait. It‘s different in every
aspect, and a manager would not want to undermine anyone‘s ability to reach a solution
by making them work individually. A group effort may show what each individual can
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bring to the table. Robbins lists five personality dimensions which influence a person‘s
ability to cope in a disastrous situation:
Self-awareness: being aware of what you‘re feeling.
Self-management: the ability to manage your own emotions and impulses.
Self—motivation: the ability to persist in the face of setbacks and failures.
Empathy: the ability to sense how others are feeling.
Social skills: the ability to handle the emotions of others.
These dimensions are defined as emotional intelligence which Robbins defines as ―an
assortment of noncognitive skills, capabilities, and competencies that influences a
person‘s ability to cope with environmental demands and pressures.‖ Recognizing these
dimensions is to know how first responders and other employees react and cope with
sudden chaos.

Insubordination and the Repercussions
Insubordination is a problem among all companies and agencies worldwide. Particularly
within the DHS it is important to note that many agencies under one department may lead
to several instances where insubordination may develop, a major one being employees of
a particular agency not recognizing the managerial style of another. There is an ego
factor which needs to be overcome and controlled. Individuals who display
insubordination must face sanctions such as suspension and possibly termination. In a
department such as the DHS, agencies cannot waste all managerial resources on
insubordination while terrorism is at its peak since the U.S. was attacked in 2001.
Strictness and zero tolerance for any employees who display such behavior is not
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acceptable with DHS agencies and tough sanctions are to be implemented to deter
employees from acting out against management and their colleagues.

Overall Managerial Aspects in Securing U.S. Ports
How do we guard our ports without jeopardizing international commerce? The answer is
to develop international relations with foreign government agencies and implement the
IURP to ensure what may not was scanned at the ports in the United States that they were
in some way scanned before departing a foreign city. Verification of some sort whether it
be a stamp, a barcode, or a computer generated recording system, could be a way to
further secure our borders from retrieving WMD and other hazardous material.

To implement the IURP, the managerial integrations of international relations begins
within the DHS. We must focus on working on the employees of the agencies and
ensuring everyone is following the same agenda without concern. There must be an
overall agreement among higher levels of authority throughout these agencies; to do this
close monitoring of group efforts and communication between personnel and countries
abroad will have to be scrutinized. There is no one checklist to figure out what will work
the best, that is why we must focus on as many different aspects of risk assessment as
possible to ensure utmost security and success for the IURP.
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CHAPTER III
The United States Department of Homeland Security:
A Strategic Plan to Protect Elements of the Infrastructure from Cyber Terrorism
Executive Summary:
One of the nation‘s top priorities is the safety and stability of the United States‘
infrastructure both at home and abroad. As technology advanced throughout the years,
different components became more closely linked. Prior to technological advances,
systems of our infrastructure were independent of one another with very little linkage.
However, today‘s operations, through advances in technology, have become interlinked
through computer systems.
Critical infrastructures such as oil, telecommunication, gas, electricity, banking, nuclear
plants, law enforcement and emergency services are at a high risk should there be a
cyber-attack. The Cyberterrorism Defense Analysis Center (CDAC) states that ―the
threat of cyberterrorism to our technical infrastructure is real and immediate. Computers
and servers in the United States are the most aggressively targeted information systems in
the world, with attacks increasing in severity, frequency, and sophistication each year. As
our nation‘s critical infrastructure grows more reliant on information technologies, it also
becomes more exposed to attackers, both foreign and domestic. These attacks can
threaten our nation‘s economy, public works, communication systems, and computer
networks‖ (FEMA).
This report will analyze an element of the nation‘s infrastructure vulnerable to the
infiltration by terrorists via cyberspace and furthermore address the process in which we
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can strategically minimize threats in industries threatened by cyber terrorism. The main
focus for this report will be on a critical infrastructure of the banking and finance
divisions. The oversight of such areas would typically fall under the watchful eye of the
U.S. Department of Treasury. It is extremely crucial for this country and for others alike
in securing and maintaining the economy around the world. Recently, we have seen
white collar crimes alter the lives of thousands through attempts to defraud the American
people and the government. For example, Bernie Madoff defrauded thousands across the
world through the Ponzi scheme: he embezzled $65 billion over the course of 30 years.
The banking industry, the SEC, the FBI, and other government agencies were unable to
discover this until a whistleblower testified before Congress. How can we deal with
situations like this? Simply put, the government has developed regulations regarding the
transparency of hedge funds and investment advisors. The same can be said for
individuals attempting to infiltrate banking and government computer systems in an
effort to fund terrorist activities.

Purpose:
This plan has been developed to counter the threats of terrorist groups to destroy elements
of the infrastructure via the banking systems. One way in which terrorists attempt to
infiltrate such areas is by money laundering, an action which is difficult to trace if not
caught early. According to a February 2011 report by the Director of National
Intelligence, ―We continue to monitor the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) threat closely. Some terror groups remain interested in acquiring CBRN
materials and threaten to use them. Poorly secured stocks of CBRN provide potential
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source material for terror attacks‖ (Clapper, 2011). We will have to strengthen
relationships with outside stakeholders both on a domestic and international level.
Private sector entities responsible for protecting the areas of cyberspace and contracts
with the United States Government will have to be improved.
Scope:
The scope of this coverage will be narrowed down to the United States banking
infrastructure as it relates to countries which share the same financial firms and deal with
everyday trades and commerce transaction. The United States, Europe and Asia play a
crucial role in maintaining the global economy infrastructure. Should anything happen
within the systems which are responsible for trades, shipments, and energy production,
the world could be severely paralyzed. A slight oversight on a potential terrorist lead
may result in terrorist funding which can lead to obtaining weapons that are detrimental
to countries considered to be enemies. Most entities, both private and public sector,
conduct business via computer technology. This plan is specifically produced to address
the importance of saving our banking and finance infrastructure from cyberterrorism. We
cannot afford to lose systems critical to maintaining the workings of the nation‘s
economy. An example of how we already protect our infrastructure abroad is through the
Department of Defense (DOD), an entity which operates internationally. There is quite a
bit of dependence on international military forces to help protect infrastructures abroad.
―The resilience and reliability of supporting infrastructures throughout areas of military
operations and DOD activities are crucial. Military commanders and defense sectors
place a value on the growing interdependency of national, international, and
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multinational infrastructures. Facilitating international cooperation and information are
necessary to assure global critical infrastructures are available to DOD when required‖
(Department of Defense, OUSDP). By narrowing down the areas in which most
transactions occur we will be able to apply mandates that will require stricter policies so
that terrorists are unable to infiltrate one of the most important areas of sustaining our
livelihood.

Mandates:
Several factors alter how the Department of Treasury operates. For example, ―Several
industry sectors considered to be critical infrastructures use industrial control systems in
their daily activities. These industries could be significantly affected by a cyber-attack
targeting industrial control systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, distributed control systems, and others‖ (Shea, 2002).

Figure 1.1: Current organizational structure Department of Treasury: Office of Terrorism
And Financial Intelligence (Treasury)
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From reviewing the structure above and the restrictions that may be mandated through
certain divisions, it appears as though SCADA systems are at risk because enforcement
efforts solely by the United States may not be enough to foil an attempt to launder money
to a terrorist organization. The Office of Intelligence is a critical element in enforcing
secure banking measures. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) ―is a
component of the U.S. Department of the Treasury‘s Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence (TFI). TFI marshals the Department‘s intelligence and enforcement functions
with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating
rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators,
money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats‖ (Office of
Intelligence and Analysis).
Current mandates from financial firms require reporting and disclosure pursuant to
certain acts put in place after September 11th. One such act is the Financial AntiTerrorism Act of 2001 which adheres to punishments and mandates through federal
jurisdictions in at least four main components (House of Representatives, 2001):
1. Allow for Federal subpoenas for funds in bank accounts;
2. Jurisdictional rights over foreign money-laundering attempts through any type of
foreign bank;
3. Anti-money laundering language entered upon retention agreements between a
financial institution and a prospective client or investor;
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4. If an individual or group is found to have engaged in illegal financial acts they are
punished pursuant to the Act.
Mandates like the foregoing are beneficial for governments who are attempting to locate
possible terrorists trying to fund their criminal acts through wire transfers and infiltration
via financial firms and investments.

Stakeholder Analysis
Certain stakeholders in the banking area are numerous; however, we have to
realize that because of mandates in the Act, they are required to have oversight with antimoney laundering rules. Stakeholders in the public sector include the following:

1. United States government;
2. Foreign governments who have entered into treaties with the United States
regarding anti-money laundering rules and regulations.

Stakeholders in the private sector include the following:

All financial institutions including but not limited to: banking firms, hedge funds,
investment advisors, and investment managers. In accordance with investment rules with
off shore and on shore entities, they all add language to prospectus memoranda regarding
the anti-money laundering rules; These stakeholders are critical in operating with the
strategic goals and operations set forth in this report.
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Vision Statement
Currently the Department of Treasury‘s vision statement is as follows:
―The Department strives to achieve prosperity and stability in the U.S. and global
economy currently and in the future. This fervent desire serves as the inspiration for the
people of the Treasury Department, sets the direction for the organization, and provides
the foundation for strategic planning‖ (Strategic Plan, 2010).

The new strategic plan being proposed in this report will continue the vision of the
Department of Treasury‘s current statement. However, in addition to the foregoing we
will have to add how we intend to consistently apply efforts through newly negotiated
agreements with countries and private stakeholders. Specifically the vision statement
should include the following: ―To increase efforts of the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of
2001, we will sustain a foundation for maintaining most current agreements which adhere
to newly implemented strategic goals.‖

Mission Statement
The Department of Treasury‘s mission statement is as follows:
―Maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities by promoting
conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen
national security by combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system,
and manage the U.S. Government's finances and resources effectively‖ (Strategic Plan,
2010). In order to create a strong economy and promote conditions to enable economic
growth we must follow orders of the new strategic plan so that potential terrorist
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infiltrations within our banking and commerce infrastructures do not subject the world‘s
economy to a complete downfall.
Internal and External Situational Analysis
The chart below indicates all the controls which may have an impact on how we
implement our strategic planning process:

INTERNAL STRENGTHS

INTERNAL WEAKNESSES

EXTERNAL STRENGTHS

EXTERNAL WEAKNESSES

Excellent task force measures
created
Internal management staff seems to
be aware of the goals and new
strategic assessments implemented
since 2001
Department of Treasury is premiere
force in securing the banking
industry from elements of cyber
terrorism
After review previous strategic
plans, the Department of Treasury
needs better relations seem to lack
with agencies that may be of
assistance when dealing with
international relations (ie. State
Department)
Lack of transparency from banking
industries
Certain rules exempt banks and
other financial institutions from
reporting to the government
possible red flags
Good relationships with other
private sector stakeholders
Good relationships with other
nations that are also interested in
protecting their own banking
infrastructure
Different rules and regulations
prevent certain measures to be
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taken by the United States
Certain areas of interest to the
United States fail to comply with
requests
The strategic plans do not extend
past five years
The banking infrastructure industry
must attempt to grasp the control as
a part of a lead agency to work hand
in hand with the private
sector. Furthermore, interagency
cooperation is necessary to ensure
secure borders and sectors within
federal buildings.

Identify the Strategic Issues
Strategically, an issue that arises from a situation analysis is that of inner managerial
controls. In order to place strategic goals on an international basis, we ensure that all
internal controls within the Department are rid of the internal weaknesses. There is little
transparency amongst governments, and obtaining cooperation from reluctant countries
can make it difficult for the United States to enforce its efforts to screening banking
industries and protecting the infrastructure. Another strategic issue is that of the timeline.
Previous strategic plans have not gone beyond five years, and given the advancement in
technology we must prepare these plans so that we can apply them over a ten year plan.
As administrations change we have to maintain the strategic plan or we may risk another
change in a strategic plan; we need to be on the same page for at least a decade before we
can start seeing results in the long term.
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Performance Goals
To determine whether or not a performance goal has been successful will be
measured by the outcomes. Below are four strategic performance goals and the
anticipated outcome for each goal:
Figure 1.2 Performance Goals and Expected Outcomes

STRAGIC GOAL

EXPECTED OUTCOME

1) Annual auditing procedures
specifically set for the oversight
of governmental cyber security
in charge of financial
transactions between the United
States and other countries (ie.
Countries such in Europe &
Asia)
2) Combat national cyber threats
by assigning private sector
network security firms to monitor
international financial firms

As a result of the oversight we will
expect to see an increase of
transparency of transactions that are
conducted between countries that are
prone to terrorist activity.

3) Accountability for management
and those in charge of
implementing protective
procedures

With this goal we will be able to filter
out areas which are not obtaining
additional security measures and thus
save money on areas which have not
been successful in assessing
accountability among government
bodies.

4) Ensure that international
stakeholders are also taking
precautions to ensure the safety
of their own areas of network
security which are vital to the

Annual training and meetings with
private sector network security
companies must be aware of
international security measures and

Without burdening the government in
its entirety the outcome here is to
leverage some of the assistance of
network security to industries who have
sophisticated resources to monitor
financial transaction on an international
basis.
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through informational sessions obtain
an understanding of how terrorists are
now funding one another through
banking divisions across the world.

Performance Indicator
Performance indicators utilized to measure the outcomes of the plan are audits
and assessments by the Office of Inspector General and statistics compiled by
stakeholders responsible for securing lines of financial transactions. Studies retrieved
from countries in Europe and Asia will be used to compare risk assessments from
previous years. Continual communication ties by the Treasury Department and financial
sector firms both at home and abroad are the performance indicators through which we
will be able to establish whether or not the strategic planning process is succeeding.
Strategy for Implementation
The strategy will be implemented by the United States Department of Treasury in
conjunction with financial sector stakeholders both at home and abroad. For example,
Goldman Sachs has an interest in foreign investments throughout the world. If we can
encourage transparency through transactions which occur between countries that are most
susceptible to terrorism, we can decrease the threat of extremists infiltrating these
banking system and destroying some of the most important aspects of commerce. Also
responsible for implementing such strategic operations are foreign governmental bodies.
They must be held responsible for understanding how the banking and finance industry is
critical to the infrastructure within the banking and finance industry. As reported in the
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Fiscal Year 2010 Performance and Accountability Report, ―Treasury served a leading
role in establishing the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) a Kabul-based task
force charged with collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to disrupt
funding and support for the Taliban and other terrorist and insurgent networks in
Afghanistan. It provides threat finance expertise to U.S. civilian and military leaders and
assists Afghan authorities in investigations of insurgent finance, narcotics trafficking, and
government corruption. Through this assistance, the ATFC has helped build the capacity
of Afghan authorities to operate independently, a key U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan‖
(Performance and Accountability Report, 2010). The ultimate goal here is to eliminate
cyber threats within the infrastructure of our banking and finance industry. There are
several strategic factors implemented by the Department of Treasury to diminish such
threats; however, these goals are not 100% preventative measures so we must keep an
ongoing effort to deter criminal acts. Instead of a three to five year plan, this new
strategic plan will aim to achieve results within a five to ten year time period. This will
be implemented by OIA and private network security companies. All private
stakeholders and foreign governmental agencies responsible for governing financial
transactions will have to secure their connections for any funds going to and from the
United States through foreign avenues.
Budget and Resources
The Department of Treasury has designed a strategy to promote better objectives.
For FY 2012, Treasury‘s new budget reflects a new plan coordinated by the government
to seek better developed objectives. Specifically, ―The Presidential Policy Directive on
Global Development – the culmination of months of interagency research and debate –
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concludes that we should ‗redouble our efforts to support, reform, and modernize
multilateral development organizations most critical to our interests,‘ and to that end,
‗renew our leadership in the multilateral development banks.‘‖
Figure 1.3 reflects the budget requests and appropriations by the Department:

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2012

Approp.

CR Level

Request

Request
Full Numbers

Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth (MDBs)
International
Development
Association (IDA)

1,262.5

1,262.
5

1,358.5

1,358,500,000

Int’l Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)

117.4

117,364,344

Inter-American
Development Bank
(IDB and FSO)

102.0

102,018,035

Multilateral
Investment Fund
(MIF)

25.0

25.0

25.0

25,000,000

Inter-American
Investment
Corporation (IIC)

4.7

4.7

20.4

20,428,519

Asian Development
Bank (AsDB)

0.0

106.6

106,585,848

Asian Development
Fund (AsDF)

105.0

115.3

115,250,000

African Development
Bank (AfDB)

105.0
32.4

32,417,720
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African Development
Fund (AfDF)

155.0

European Bank for
Reconstruction &
Development (EBRD)
Subtotal

- 50 155.0

195.0

195,000,000

0.0

1,552.2

1,552.2

0

2,072.6

2,072,564,466

(Geightner, 2010)
Over $2 billion is necessary to implement the plan in developing countries as well as
industrialized countries. Over the course of five years the strategic performance goals
require a long term effort in hopes of increasing international oversight while risks are
minimized.
Over a five to ten year plan, funds between $10 billion to $20 billion will be required.
This number is based on estimated totals for 2010. An estimated $2 billion a year needed
to apply to the development of other banks is easily doubled, with stricter security
measures which require more personnel and contractor. Not only are we sustaining the
security of other banking divisions countries but we have to ensure that commerce and
other legitimate trades done through our banking systems do not negatively affect the
nation‘s economy.
Conclusion
As we entered the 21st century the entire world was rattled by the events of September
11th. The impact on the economy rippled beyond ground zero. Over the past nine and a
half years terrorists have become more sophisticated and are now changing the way they
attack countries they consider to be enemies. We must rely on these strategic efforts put
in place to deter such activity. If we stop them in their tracks from every possible angle,
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including the infiltration through our banking and commerce infrastructure, then we
possibly may have foiled an attack that may have ended in utter destruction. If we want
to prevent another September 11th then we must start from the very beginning; we must
localize and attack the sources. Just as ground forces are eliminating terrorist cells in the
Middle East, we must also continue to help eliminate them in cyberspace.
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CHAPTER IV
The United States Department of Homeland Security:
Constitutional Issues Relating to Military Tribunals
Introduction:
Constitutional issues relating to the management and strategic planning of the
International United Reliance Program (IURP) is difficult to analyze simply because it is
an international development. Simply put the IURP deals with two main components,
foreign security forces and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG is a
branch of the U.S. Armed Forces and as result is governed by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).

Currently, treaties between the United States and other countries rely on how well we
develop the relationships in order to ensure that treaties are continually followed. The
same can be said for the IURP. In order to ensure safer ports at home we have to ensure
shipments from abroad are scanned and/or checked prior to their departure. Jeff Conklin
who wrote a chapter on Wicked Problems & Social Complexity discusses ―forces of
fragmentation.‖ Forces of fragmentation ―suggests a condition in which the people
involved see themselves as more separate than united, and in which information and
knowledge are chaotic and scattered.‖ He writes that the solution to this problem is to
have a shared understanding with the same commitments. There are elements which may
contribute to communication errors internationally. Extremely common, these problems
are usually inevitable in any work setting; they usually persist due to applying
inappropriate methods and tools to solve these problems. If we do not understand
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problems, we cannot simply apply any method in attempt to solve them; the key is to first
identify the problem and find the appropriate method which can be applied.
Depending on the individuals and agencies involved, it becomes much more socially
complex to communicate. For instance, if we are dealing with a security forces and
foreign government agencies in the Middle East there is a language barrier and a culture
barrier (Conklin, 2005).

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will have to be prepared to deal with such
elements. Implementing a strategy means that we have to also take into consideration the
technical complexities, specifically, they ―raise the risk of project failure; [they are] also
the most well recognized fragmenting force. Dialogue Mapping provides an approach and
set of tools for dealing with the nontechnical side of fragmentation‖ (Conklin, 2005).
Dialogue Mapping is extremely important when dealing with the nontechnical
complexities. It not only addresses the problems involved, but it also allows diverse
countries to apply ―coherency‖ to such complexities. Coherence is defined as ―shared
meaning for key terms and concepts, that [all] are clear about their roles in the effort, that
together they have shared understanding of the background for the project and what the
issues are, and that they have a shared commitment to how the project will reach its
objectives and achieve success‖ (Conklin, 2005).

As we can see from the foregoing, we are able to analyze safety measures based on
management and strategic methods and also analyze the military aspect when we detain
criminals who are involved with terrorism and conspiracy. This legal analysis from a
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military standpoint will provide for the issues surrounding the UCMJ and military
tribunals. With the analysis of the UCMJ, we will also show how broad military
authority contributes to issues involving military tribunals and the uses of interrogations.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice:
The UCMJ is a body of law which governs aspects of the military. Certain laws and
procedures are put in place for military personnel. Due to unique circumstances the
UCMJ exists because of the operations of the military and the international entities that
these forces are dealing with; it covers not only at a domestic level but also aspects of
detention of non-U.S. citizens. The purpose of this military code is to show how we
operate with laws governing our military efforts abroad. Specifically, ―Military law
includes jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction exercised by
commanders with respect to nonjudicial punishment. The purpose of military law is to
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States‖ (Manual For Courts-Martial). The
UCMJ‘s purpose is to protect the rights of those detainees held during times of war and
how procedures are implemented. The UCMJ also provides rules and regulations for
military personnel. This includes cadets, reservists, active duty soldiers, and active duty
retirees.

For example, the USCG is responsible for securing our borders in areas outside of the
jurisdiction of customs enforcement. RAND suggests that a container arriving at a U.S.
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port is subjected to several checks. ―The 24-hour advanced manifest rule requires carriers
to submit manifest information 24 hours before cargo is loaded onto a U.S. bound vessel.
In this time, Customs Border Patrol performs a background check on the manifest, carrier
and shipper to determine if the shipment poses a risk to the United States.‖ With the
UCMJ in place, the USCG will have to implement the regulations set in place to enforce
laws that are crucial to securing our borders.

Military Tribunal Overview
After September 11, 2001, President Bush implemented military tribunals for anyone
who assisted in terrorist attacks against the United States. ―One of the principal methods
of legislative control over military trials, including tribunals, are the Articles of War that
Congress enacts into law. The Constitution vests in Congress the power to ‗constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,‘ to ‗make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,‘ and to ‗define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.‘ By enacting
Articles of War, Congress defined not only the procedures but also the punishments to be
applied to the field of military law‖ (Fisher).
Issues 1: Trials:
David Kellogg, author of ―Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials‖
(2002) posts an interesting question regarding detainees: ―Those captured al Qaeda
fighters were certainly not innocent civilians. But neither were they legitimate soldiers.
President Bush‘s use of the term ‗unlawful combatants‘ comes fairly close to an accurate
description, but what does that tell us about how we are to treat them?‖ This is a fair
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question. We need to take an in depth look at how we treat detainees who are not
soldiers. Are they to be prosecuted in federal court or in a military tribunal. While the
definition of a military tribunal seems clear, we have to note that these tribunals are
significantly different from that of courts-martial because we are not trying individuals
who are a part of the armed forces. The ability to have a fair trial during a military
tribunal for detainees is questionable. First, charges are brought by military personnel
and the jury contains members of the armed forces. This may indicate prejudice on the
part of the jury. In fact, it can be simple to say that members on a jury may have a bias
against an individual due to the nature of the allegations. This is an issue that poses a
legitimate concern for how we can try individuals impartially. Since every aspect of a
military tribunal is handled by military officials, and this includes the judges, jurors, and
lawyers, we must question the impartiality against these detainees. There is a legitimate
concern of whether or not they are receiving a fair and balanced trial and if the evidence
used to convict a person of a war-crime is sufficient. Jennifer Elsea, legislative attorney,
for the American Law Division questions the legitimacy of international law and the
constitutionality of military tribunals in that, ―tribunals could violate any rights the
accused may have under the Constitution as well as their rights under international law,
thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The
Administration initially responded that the M.O. provided only the minimum
requirements for a full and fair trial, and that the Secretary of Defense intended to
establish rules prescribing detailed procedural safeguards for tribunals established‖
(Elsea). This is an aspect of our culture that has evolved since September 11th and we are
still evolving and re-analyzing the way we put alleged terrorists on trial.
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Issue 2: Treatment of Detainees Awaiting Trial:
Prior to detaining individuals they must be deemed ―enemy combatant.‖ The way in
which they are ruled as enemy combatant is up to the discretion of the military. Once
they are ruled as enemy combatants, they are placed in a detention center created
specifically for suspect terrorists. Because of the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war
are to be treated humanely and torture is not permitted. ―Measures that seek to eliminate
(rather than merely circumscribe) detainees‘ ability to bring constitutional challenges
regarding the circumstances of their detention would likely be subject to serious legal
challenge…it is clear that the procedural and substantive due process protections of the
Constitution apply to all persons within the United States, regardless of their citizenship‖
(Garcia). However, this has not been the case for individuals kept in prisons such as
Guantanamo Bay. There are detainees who have been held for several years without any
charges. Marked as enemy combatants, these individuals were not brought to trial nor
were they read their rights pursuant to the Geneva Conventions or the U.S. Constitution.
Issue 3: Rights of Detainees
Pursuant to military tribunals all detainees are allotted the rights of the U.S. Constitution.
One serious concern that has been debated since September 11th are rights that detainees
are given and whether or not detainees are notified of their rights. ―Various
constitutional provisions, most notably those arising from the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, apply to defendants throughout the process of
criminal prosecutions‖ (Garcia ). The right to plead the Fifth Amendment and the right to
a speedy trial have clearly not been implemented for individuals awaiting trial.
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However, an argument which has been brought up regarding enemy combatants subject
to military tribunals is, ―the application of these constitutional requirements might differ
depending upon the forum in which charges are brought. The Fifth Amendment‘s
requirement that no person be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and the Sixth Amendment‘s requirements
concerning trial by jury, have been found to be inapplicable to trials by military
commissions or courts-martial.‖ (Garcia) There is a gap in regards to the Constitutional
rights for individuals held in places like Guantanamo. Although clearly applied through
legislation that Constitutional rights are allotted for all individuals detained in the United
States and outside of the United States, there is a discrepancy on how these rights are
applied for those who are considered to be enemy combatants and if whether or not they
are subject to a military tribunal. Not only are they subject to longer detentions without
being protected by the Sixth Amendment, they are not being charged for crimes alleged
against these individuals. Furthermore, there has not been a process in which a
determination has been made as to whether or not these individuals will be tried in a
military tribunal or in federal court.
Issue 4: Hearsay Rulings
Regardless of what type of venue, every court has procedural rules set in place to provide
for evidentiary rules. For example, in cases in which hearsay is permissible in court,
there are standards that are substantially different from one another when it involves
hearsay in trials involving terrorism. ―In prosecutions alleging material support to
terrorist organizations, evidence of statements by co-conspirators may be introduced
against a defendant at trial even if those statements would not have qualified under a
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hearsay exception. Before these statements may be admitted, it is necessary to establish
that the conspiracy exists‖ (Garcia). Is this fair for the purposes of convicting a potential
terrorist or co-conspirator? Hearsay brought into military tribunals under the under
Military Commission Rules of Evidence are much more lenient and permissive in these
courts. ―While courts have yet to rule as to whether the Confrontation Clause‘s
protections against hearsay extend to noncitizens brought before military commissions
held at Guantanamo, it would certainly appear to restrict the use of hearsay evidence in
cases brought against detainees transferred to the United States‖ (Garcia). There is a lot
of confusion involving the rights of individuals being held for terrorist acts inside the
United States and outside of the United States (ie, Guantanamo). There are statements
which may contradict or show inconsistency and interfere with the verdict for the
individual on trial.
Issue 5: Geneva Conventions vs. Military Tribunal workings
The last four issues focused on specific matters concerning the treatment and rights of
prisoners held during times of war. Particularly these were the rights of individuals
subject to military tribunals. Matters which lead to the charges of individuals and how
they are obtained come to question. The first subject which comes to mind is
interrogation techniques used against individuals who are being held for allegations
related to terrorism. Let us focus on an issue which has been a topic of controversy for
many years: waterboarding. Is this seen as a violation of the Geneva Conventions? One
assessment is that since no real physical harm is being done to the individual, this is not a
form of torture. The same hold true for stress positions; we do not see any signs of
physical torture so we believe these individuals are not being tortured; therefore this does
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not violate the Geneva Conventions. The Bush Administration argued that Al Qaeda and
similar organizations were not subject to the Geneva Conventions. Even in a CRS Report
to Congress in 2008, ―the Court held that such tribunals did not comply with the Uniform
Code of Military Justice or the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions‖ (Garcia).
However, the aftermath of such a ruling led to many controversies surrounding the CIA‘s
and Department of Defense‘s interrogation methods. This is a direct conflict about how
we try these detainees. First, we do not know if the detainees are even subject to a
military tribunal; second, when a decision on how they will be tried still remains
undecided, they are treated as individuals who are deemed war criminals and therefore
treated in a manner that does not comply with the Geneva Conventions. An example of
how such techniques were abusive towards these detainees is seen in 2004.
―Investigations related to the allegations at Abu Ghraib revealed that some of the
techniques discussed for ‗unlawful combatants‘ had come into use in Iraq, although none
of the prisoners there was deemed to be an unlawful combatant‖ (Elsea). These types of
acts have smeared images of our military forces across the globe. Abuse allegations by
the military forces and the proof alike will be a matter of investigation if we fail to
determine how we treat our prisoners.
Conclusion
As we transitioned from the workings of the USCG and the governing rules of the USMJ,
this analysis showed how an Armed Forces member overseeing the waters of the United
States (in addition to other military forces protecting our nation) can lead us into an area
which will remain a controversial issue for many years. The United States and the UCMJ
are in a difficult position, because we have to balance rules and regulations relating to the
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rights of individuals and the crimes that they may have committed. Those held on
terrorism allegations inside the United States and those who are being held outside of the
United States will generate debate amongst all political parties. There are problems with
military tribunals in which the previous administration demonstrated that these are not
applicable under the Geneva Conventions. As a result of such rulings, we have seen
numerous counts of abuse in Abu Ghraib and detainees being held for years without a
single charge or determination of whether or not they will be tried in federal court or a
military tribunal. The U.S. Constitution does not apply to terrorists because of the nature
of the acts they have committed. These are not crimes suitable for civilian courts and
should be tried in a court specific to the crimes committed against our country.

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 64 -

References

Conlkin, Jeff. (2005). Dialogue mapping: building shared understanding of wicked
problems. CogNexus.
Frelinger, D.R., Jackson, B.A. (2009). RAND: Homeland Security, Emerging threats and
security planning.
Kellogg, David. Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials. (2002)

"Manual for Courts-Martial United States." 2008. Web. 02 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.uscg.mil/legal/mj/MJ_Doc/mcm2008.pdf>.
Soller, Major Daniel E. Operational Ethics: Just War and Implications for Contemporary
American Warfare. School of Advanced Military Studies, Feb. 2003. Web. 3 Feb.
2011. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=39294&coll=limited>.
United States. Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service.
Lawfulness of Interrogation Techniques under the Geneva Conventions. By
Jennifer K. Elsea. 2004. Homeland Security Digital Library. Web. 2 Feb. 2011.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=35948&coll=limited>.
United States. Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service.
Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues. By Michael John
Garcia, Elizabeth B. Bazan, R. Chuck Mason, Edward C. Liu, and Anna C.

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 65 -

Henning. 2010. Homeland Security Digital Library. Web. 3 Feb. 2011.
<https://www.hsdl.org/.
United States. Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service.
Military Tribunals: Historical Patterns and Lessons. By Louis Fisher. 2004.
Homeland Security Digital Library. Web. 3 Feb. 2011. <https://www.hsdl.org.
United States. Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. The
War Crimes Act: Current Issues. By Michael John Garcia. 2008. Homeland
Security Digital Library. Web. 2 Feb. 2011. <http://The War Crimes Act: Current
Issues>.
United States. Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. The
Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural
Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. By Jennifer K. Elsea. 2006. Homeland Security Digital Library.
Web. 3 Feb. 2011. <https://www.hsdl.org/.

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 66 -

CHAPTERV
The USA PATRIOT Act vs. Human Rights
Is the United States Infringing Upon Human Rights?
Since the tragic events of September 11th took place in 2001, we have seen a significant
increase in law enforcement activities. Particularly, we saw the creation of The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which placed twenty two federal agencies
under one department to ensure coordination of counterintelligence reports. Along with
the creation of the DHS we also saw the creation of the USAPATRIOTACT (Act).
Signed into law by then President H.W. Bush on October 26, 2001, the
USAPATRIOTACT stands for: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.

John Podesta, author of USA PATRIOT Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, has
stated that the Act‘s purpose is ―to expand surveillance powers to track terrorists; all
residents, not just the terrorists, are affected. . . . There are several common sense
changes that could be made to the new law that would provide better protections for civil
liberties without sacrificing security. Because of the rapidity with which the law was
enacted, Congress, wisely included a four-year sunset of many of the provisions of the
new Act. That sunset will allow Congress to make some needed adjustments, hopefully in
a calmer climate, and strengthen the protections for civil liberties without sacrificing
security.‖ This view is shared among many individuals who have attempted to change
this legislation or to have it dropped by any means. The American Civil Liberties Union
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(ACLU) is an advocate of human rights and the Act is one that this group feels is an
infringement upon not only the civil liberties of U.S. citizens but also threatens how we
view human rights laws as whole. President Obama had signed an extension of the
PATRIOT Act in February 2010.

Since inception of the Act, this new law has created much controversy over the years
with respect to civil rights and whether or not this violates human rights as a whole. In
order to understand the controversy we must first have a good understanding of the Act,
how it is applied, and finally whether or not we can conclude if this infringes upon
human rights of not only the citizens of the U.S. but also those who live abroad.

On October 26, 2001 former President George H.W. Bush remarked after signing the
Act, ―This bill was carefully drafted and considered. Led by the members of Congress on
this stage, and those seated in the audience, it was crafted with skill and care,
determination and a spirit of bipartisanship for which the entire nation is grateful. This
bill met with an overwhelming agreement in Congress, because it upholds and respects
the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution‖ (Reclaiming Patriotism, 2009). This
statement is controversial for some believe that the Act in fact does not uphold the civil
liberties granted by our Constitution.
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Provisions within the Act that make this law controversial have led some to believe that
not only does it infringe upon human and civil rights of our country‘s citizens, but also
that the Act may not have had a major impact on how we counter terrorism. The issue is
not whether or not this infringes up on the rights of would be terrorists, but rather of U.S.
citizens. The purpose of this analysis is to provide a background and a response as to
why the Act does not infringe upon human rights or the civil liberties of our citizens.

Every country defines human rights and civil liberties (used interchangeably and labeled
as ―civil liberties‖ hereafter) differently. The way the United States defines civil liberties
is drafted within the Constitution. However, since the Constitution is a living document,
one can safely assume that that the definition is constantly changing. When the
Constitution was drafted, it was during a time when the population was small, religion
was one, and politics were new. Forward 224 years later and we find that globalization
has created a massive melting pot in America. Because of this we have seen the evolving
of the Constitution. The Second Amendment which states that an individual has the right
to bear arms was a very lenient stipulation when it was created compared to now when
licenses and strict regulations have been enforced. The idea that the American
government must do everything possible to protect this country can be agreed upon by
many Americans; however some Americans do not want their privacy violated in any
way. One could even say that the Act interferes with human rights. The Act lists five
factors to pursue in order to counter terrorism: 1) improve sharing of information
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies; 2) gather antiterrorism
intelligence by taking advantage of the flexible warrants requirement of the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); 3) expand wiretap authority over electronic
communications; 4) seize funding utilized in terrorist activities; and 5) impose mandatory
detention and deportation of non-U.S. citizens who are suspected of having links to
terrorist organization (Banks, 2004). An analysis of these five elements will dictate how
the Act can provide for the safety and security of human rights rather than have a
negative impact on human rights.

Improve Sharing of Information between Law Enforcement and Foreign Intelligence
Agencies
Since inception of the DHS twenty two federal agencies have been granted the power to
share intelligence information for the sake of protecting the borders and infrastructure of
the United States. Section 203 of the Act contains provisions in which intelligence
sharing and grand jury material can be shared among agencies in order to better facilitate
counterterrorism efforts. Specifically, Section 203 provides for the following:
―Procedures.—The Attorney General shall establish procedures for the disclosure of
information pursuant to section 2517(6) and Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) of the 19 Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure that identifies a United States person, as defined in section
101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 22 1801)). Foreign
Intelligence information.— (1) in general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) or foreign intelligence
information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security
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official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his
official duties. Any federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision
may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person‘s official duties
subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (2)
Definition.—In this subsection, the term ‗‗foreign intelligence information‘‘ means— (A)
information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability
of the United States to protect against— (i) actual or potential attack or other grave
hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (ii) sabotage or
international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.‖

Information is vital so that various government agencies are able to protect human rights.
We cannot simply deny the fact that this not been vital in foiling potential terrorist
attacks. There has been very little concern as to whether these agencies serve little
purpose to protecting the life and liberties of an individual. Organizations opposed to the
Act fail to recognize that this Act contains provisions that attempt to coordinate efforts so
that intelligence is more streamlined and efficient.

Gather Antiterrorism Intelligence by Taking Advantage of the Flexible Warrants
Requirement of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
In Title II of the Act, there are several sections which provide for exceptions on how this
country can allow for the facilitation of information gathering via wiretaps and other
communication surveillance. FISA was enacted in 1978 which gave government
oversight of foreign activities. Opponents of the Act consider this a vital piece of the Act
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which violates human rights and the civil liberties of those who wish to keep their
privacy. However, FISA is an act which does not affect the human rights of U.S.
citizens. Although FISA has extremely lenient exceptions for obtaining a warrant, this is
one part of the Act in which we do not see a violation of human rights.

FISA is crucial in obtaining certain information on individuals who may be involved with
terrorist activities, espionage, and foreign governmental activities leading up to a
potentially detrimental situation. While most believe that their phones may be tapped,
the fact is, unless the government has reason to believe that an individual has ties to
potential terror threats, the chances of being wiretapped by the government is not as
significant as it may seem. Foreign intelligence gathering is a crucial part of the Act
through which we can operate under a wide discretion of authority. Section 214 of Title
II of the Act does pertain to outside foreign terror suspects based on certain elements of
reasonable doubt. In order to investigate organizations or persons that are foreign
nationals, the U.S. Government must specify certain elements that warrant such
investigations under FISA and must certify that ―the information likely to be obtained is
foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or is relevant to an
ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.‘‘
Furthermore such investigations must specify the identity, if known, of the person who is
the subject of the investigation and the identity, if known, of the person to whom is
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leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or other facility to which the pen
register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied.
Other sections in Title II of the Act describe warrants placed under FISA. Still others
such as 223 involve civil action suits against the United States which may be filed by a
victim when there have been unauthorized disclosures. Specifically, the Act provides for
the implementation of Title 18 of the USC 2520: ―Administrative discipline.—If a court
or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its
departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter, and the court or
appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation
raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States
acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency
shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or
appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether
disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the
department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or
she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency
concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such
determination.‖

One can assert here that wide discretion is not limitless for the government. The U.S.
must observe certain boundaries in order to proceed with investigations into foreign
intelligence interests, because that may also have an impact on a national level. Civil
rights in this case are not fully dismissed. Individuals are allotted the right to sue the
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United States if in fact they discover the investigation into them was unjust. Civil
liberties remain at bay as described in Title II of the Act.
Expand Wiretap Authority over Electronic Communications
The use of electronic wiretaps by the government has been one of the main criticisms of
the Act. Americans today are concerned with having their liberties stripped away by the
fact that the government is allowed to tap into their conversations or emails or internet
searches. Under Title II Section 225 of the Act, FISA has placed immunity for
compliance with FISA wiretap. As such, Section 225 specifically states: ― No cause of
action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or
other specified person thereof) that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical
assistance in accordance with a court order or request for emergency assistance under this
Act.‘‘ By that definition, it can be easily inferred that there is immunity for anyone who
gives any information pertaining to certain interests in individuals the government may
have. Although true, some do not recognize that Title 18 still applies in this situation.
Because of Title 18, we acknowledge the fact that probable cause still remains in effect
and authorities, though given wider discretion, must be able to provide ample information
to higher court officials that the investigations into certain individuals warrant possible
terrorist ties. Again, the FISA we enacted in 1978 and thereafter empowers government
officials who have been applying the FISA these past three decades. Having considered
what has been conducted in the past prior to the Act, it can be argues there was a discreet
PATRIOT Act already in place.
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Seize Funding Utilized in Terrorist Activities
This is one of the lesser constraints of the Act that does not infringe upon human rights.
We recognize that major terrorist organizations are operating because of the funding they
receive from various ―legal‖ organizations. Title III of the Act has almost fifty sections
which explain the implications for anti-money laundering laws and other acts such as
Bank Secrecy Act. Title III involves not only government law enforcement agencies, but
also private sector banking industries who are required to report certain suspicious
activities. For example, if an individual deposits over $10,000 in his or her bank account,
the bank will automatically file a suspicious activity report which is reported to the
government. Should this person‘s name appear on one of these reports, the government
can go in and investigate whether or not these funds are for legal purposes and track
where this money may lead. What may be a concern to individuals who feel that their
rights are being violated is that every single banking activity they are involved with is
being monitored by the government. However, there are sections of Title III of the Act
which outline suspicious activities which will then lead to the interest of the government
(not the other way around).

To randomly suspect individuals that could be involved with illegal activities would be
very inefficient, so Title III lays out certain provisions under law that both public and
private sector entities must adhere to; Sections 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 217, 318,
319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 330, and Subtitle B under the Bank Secrecy Act
entail amendments pursuant to the Act which detail and outline who may be investigated,
how private sector entities are to be involved, what recommendations for criminal
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penalties shall be, and most importantly, to what extend the government has jurisdiction.
Individuals who fear that their banking records are being tracked by the government must
recognize that they will not be targeted persons of interest unless, again, the government
receives information based upon certain activity reports or if for any reason the person‘s
name is related to a terrorist organization. Civil rights are not a factor here since
government oversight on money laundering schemes is also investigated with persons
that are involved in organized crime or other criminal elements. Simply put, just because
these clauses are inserted into the Act does not mean that they are designed specifically
for ―spying‖ on individuals. These sections have been in place for many years and have
been included with the Act as a means to cover the grounds of terrorist activities. There
is no reason to believe a person is being monitored by the government unless that person
is involved with illegal activities.

Impose Mandatory Detention and Deportation of Non-U. S. Citizens Who Are Suspected
of

Having Links to Terrorist Organizations

Protecting our borders from individuals who are deemed dangerous to the safety and
security of the United States is vital. However, how do we deal with individuals that are
a threat to this country that are already living within the borders of the United States?
Organizations such as the ACLU could argue that targeting individuals with names
related to those that are deemed persons of interest could be infringing upon their civil
rights. An article entitled, ―Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Reconsider the Patriot Act,‖
drafted by the ACLU, addresses the implications for certain individuals who are
suspected of providing material support to terrorist organizations.
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Specifically, the ACLU suggests that ―Such unjust and counter-productive consequences
are a direct result of the overbroad and unconstitutionally vague definition of material
support in the statute. The First Amendment protects an individual‘s right to join or
support political organizations and to associate with others in order to pursue common
goals. The framers understood that protecting speech and assembly were essential to the
creation and functioning of a vibrant democracy. As a result, the government cannot
punish mere membership in or political association with disfavored groups – even those
that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity – without the strictest safeguards‖
(Reclaiming patriotism , 2009) The argument here suggests that the U.S. will impose
criminal charges on anyone that is merely ―suspected‖ of providing material support to
terrorist organizations. However, the Department of Justice cannot simply deport a nonU.S. citizen based merely on suspicion. The ACLU also claims that the individuals who
support a political organization are fully within their rights to do so and are protected by
the First Amendment. However, it seems that the ACLU‘s argument is vague itself. The
government should not allow individuals who are suspected of supporting terrorist
organizations to continue to do so; the First Amendment does not protect those who
express their freedoms in a manner which advocates violence.

Section 405 of the Act provides for the following: ―The Attorney General, in consultation
with the appropriate heads of other federal agencies, including the Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation, shall report to Congress
on the feasibility of enhancing the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other identification systems in
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order to better identify a person who holds a foreign passport or a visa and may be
wanted in connection with a criminal investigation in the United States or abroad, before
the issuance of a visa to that person or the entry or exit from the United States by that
person.‖

In furtherance of this provision Subtitle B of Section 405 discusses the enhancements to
immigration provisions. For example, Section 212 (a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act amended a clause regarding a representative of a foreign terrorist
organization. Section 405 of the Act states that ―This clause specifically identifies
individuals of interest who are attempting to cause harm against individuals of the United
States.‖ Many rights are supported by the First Amendment; however, funding a terrorist
organization should not be tolerated. Terrorist organizations attempt to strip away the
rights that individuals are entitled to; we cannot simply argue the fact that denying an
individual the right to support a terrorist organization either directly or indirectly is in
violation of their civil liberties. The deportation of non-U.S. citizens is a vital position
that the Department of Justice takes in order to protect the civil liberties of this nation.

Human rights and the civil liberties we are all entitled to should never be stripped away.
The rights afforded to individuals in this country and around the world need to be
protected, and the development of the PATRIOT Act helps in furthering that protection.
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CHAPTER VI
The Shipping Ports of New York and New Jersey: Analyzing Strategies to Secure
Maritime Assets and the United States
Technology, Cyber-threats and Maritime Critical Infrastructure
Executive Summary
The critical infrastructure of maritime security has changed over the years. Cybersecurity has advanced in both the private and public sectors across the world. The
purpose of this paper is to analyze maritime security and the cyber-threats facing today‘s
network of shipping ports and vessels. An analysis including critical nodes, budget
restraints, cyber terrorist attacks, human error, and natural disasters is necessary in order
to implement better maritime security that could have an impact on our critical
infrastructures as well as global infrastructures.

Introduction
With the advancement of technology, the critical infrastructure within the United States
has had to develop new strategies to accommodate threats that were not considered a
security risk a decade earlier. However, the United States must also consider
technological threats to infrastructure at sea. Maritime activity and ports on land are
vulnerable to cyber-threats on a global scale. Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and
cyber-threats are just some of the main concerns that need to be considered when
developing safeguards to technological components.
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September 11th is an example of how the maritime infrastructure gravely impacts the
economy, the airlines, and the buildings which were hit by the planes. The amount of
physical damage caused by this tragic terrorist attack is nothing compared to the
thousands of lives lost on that day; in addition, we have lost thousands more battling on
the front lines in the Middle East to gain control of our security against terrorist threats
for over a decade.

The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has done a similar
analysis of security aspects of their maritime operations. In November 2011, a report
drafted by ENISA concluded in an analysis that ―a key characteristic identified is that a
general insufficient focus on cyber security within the maritime sector exists. As a direct
consequence, the overall sectorial capabilities to consistently assess and deal with cyber
security challenges, are inherently reduced. One root cause of this situation is linked to
insufficient awareness of the key stakeholders involved (e.g. governments, port
authorities, shipping companies, telecommunication providers etc.) on the security
challenges, vulnerabilities and threats specific to this sector‖ (ENISA, 2011). These
threats correlate similarly with threats that are present within the United States. ENISA‘s
report on maritime security is an excellent referencing tool for the United States
government to battle against cyber-threats from terrorists within the maritime
infrastructure.

In this report, there will be an analysis and then a final recommendation as to how
maritime security should be advanced so we can maintain proper security measures
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towards our maritime critical infrastructure. The analysis of the following components is
key to understanding the maritime infrastructure:
Critical nodes and the links to maritime security identified through a
network analysis
Identifying both direct and indirect dependencies among the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Coast Guard, and characterizing
how damage can spread across multiple infrastructures and threats specific
to maritime security
Defining and applying the method of analysis which combines the
following: fault tree, event analysis, and the Model Base Vulnerability
Analysis (MBVA)
Recommendation as to which risk allocation strategy would be best suited
for maritime security and the Port Security Grand Program investment
strategy
Analyzing Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and
identifying the threats and vulnerabilities
Analyzing the impact of the internet on maritime security, and how
safeguards become vulnerable to threats
Assessment of the maritime security and a prediction for 2012 and beyond

As briefly noted, maritime security is responsible for carrying out certain strategies to
help lessen the risk of cyber-attacks as well as terrorist attacks against shipping vessels.
The surge of Somali pirates is an example of how vital it is to strategically control and
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change our assessments based on current existing threats towards not only international
government organizations but also those being taken hostage.

Section One: Critical Nodes and the Links To Maritime Security Identified Through a
Network Analysis
There are several factors that become pertinent to maritime security: critical nodes;
physical or technological items that are important parts of how an entire operation
conducts business. There are several nodes, one of which is seaports. Seaports are
critical to the global supply chain. They are important in supporting a global economic
structure which allows for resources to be insourced or outsourced to other countries.

An attack on these seaports would not only be detrimental to the economy of the United
States but also to those who trade with the United States. Other critical nodes include:
petroleum storage facilities, railroad lines, U.S. cities, and neighborhoods which lie just a
short distance from these seaports. Should a U.S. seaport succumb to an attack, it would
likely impact all the other critical nodes in its surrounding areas and possibly inflict a
high number of casualties within those areas.

According to a review, Managing Critical Infrastructure Risks, seaports, ―make a huge
contribution to the U.S. economy by facilitating trade and tourism, providing jobs, and
supplementing energy needs. U.S. seaports handle 95% of overseas trade by weight and
75% by value‖ (Linkov, 2007). Furthermore, they estimate that the ―economic impact[s]
of a major terrorist attack at a U.S. seaport vary. Earlier studies predicted that port
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closing could cost the economy as much as $1 trillion.‖ So considering the vital areas
around these seaports, any damage inflicted upon the maritime critical nodes could be
debilitating to our nation‘s economy and human life.
Section Two: Identifying Both Direct and Indirect Dependencies Among the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Coast Guard, and the Spread of Damage Across
Multiple Critical Infrastructures
As previously mentioned, closing a single port due to a disaster could cost the nation up
to $1trillion in damages. Such a hit could make this economy head towards a deep
recession, if not a depression. The Port of New York and New Jersey is an example of
how it can be extremely detrimental to not only the safety and security of our homeland
but as well as to the global economy. Direct dependencies include the reliance on other
countries to maintain their security roles, ensuring that each container does not have
weapons of mass destruction, drugs, or biological weapons. Pre-screening thousands of
cargo shipments a day is extremely difficult for the DHS to oversee. As a result, the U.S.
Coast Guard, Customs Border Patrol, and local law enforcement agencies also have a
direct impact in securing our nation‘s critical nodes.

Indirect dependencies include the use of technology from business to interact with the
DHS and its agencies and are willing to disclose what is contained within these cargo
shipments. Cooperation from outside resources, particularly the private sector, can help
maintain inventory as to what is expected from outside cargo. Bills of lading are vital
tools in completing this task. In order to prevent the spread of damage across multiple
critical infrastructures, we have to maintain a strong support system among multiple
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agencies. From the Drug Enforcement Agency, to the Customs Border Patrol, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and international organizations, all have a vital role in protecting each of
their jurisdictions so that we do not cause harm to the global economy. The Marine
Transportation System (MTS) guides interdependent roles and defines how Critical
Infrastructure and Key Roles (CI/KR) are critical to these interdependencies.
Particularly, ―The CI/KR within the maritime sector constitutes a vital part of the
complex systems necessary for public well-being, as well as economic and national
security. They are essential for the free movement of passengers and goods throughout
the world. Some physical and cyber assets, as well as associated infrastructure, also
function as defense critical infrastructure; their availability must be constantly assured for
national security operations worldwide. Just-in-time methods, utilized within industries,
must be considered for their implications on risk and vulnerability. Beyond the
immediate casualties, the consequences of an incident on one node of maritime critical
infrastructure may include disruption of entire systems, cause congestion and limit
capacity for product delivery, cause significant damage to the economy, or create an
inability to project military force. Protecting maritime infrastructure networks must
address individual elements, as well as intermodal aspects and their interdependencies
positioned both within a regulatory environment, and a system of systems‖
(Transportation Sector-Specific, Sec. 5).

The Transportation Sector-Specific Plan for the Maritime Model Implementation Plan
indicates that communication with outside stakeholders is important to sustaining other
critical infrastructures such as the economy, travel, banking and finance industries.
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―Maritime model stakeholders are formalizing new coordination processes using the
Sector Partnership Model espoused in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
The Maritime Model Government Coordinating Council (MMGCC) has [been] formed.‖
(Transportation Sector-Specific, Sec. 5) . The development of these councils and securing
partnerships is a vital example of how we can control certain interdependencies by using
advisor councils to speak on these agencies‘ behalf. It is useful to have multiple areas
that control one sector of a critical infrastructure. In this case, councils are utilized to
correspond with interdependent entities while the agencies themselves are responsible for
implementing the security measures.

Section Three: Defining and Applying the Method of Analysis which Combines the
Following: Fault Tree, Event Analysis, and the Model Based Vulnerability Analysis
(MBVA)
Before we begin to combine these analyses let us briefly differentiate each analysis:
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): This is a top-down model in which the system is used to
analyze the probability of function failure of a security measure that is in place.
Event Analysis (EA): This is a statistical analysis which determines whether the
combination of two or more departments will be a successful merge or a failed merge.
MBVA: This is a ―comprehensive method of analysis that combines network, fault,
event, and risk analysis into a single methodology for quantitatively analyzing a sector
component such as a hub. In MBVA, hubs are identified, hub vulnerabilities are
organized and quantified using a fault tree, all possible events are organized as an event
tree, and then an optimal investment strategy is computed that minimizes risk. MBVA
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gives the policy analyst a top-to-bottom tool for achieving critical infrastructure
protection under budgetary constraints‖ (Lewis, 2006).
In a metropolis like New York, ports require many strategic plans because of the unique
placement and the populations which surround these ports. The most popular
methodology that relates to the shipping ports and maritime security is through the FTA.
With maritime security, there are many identifiable hazards that can be represented by the
FTA. For example, a mathematical model can compare the past accident data so we can
identify which factors have influenced these incidents the most. We can then use the
FTA to predict future incidents.

In cyber terrorism attacks we have to predict the probability of attacks. In order to do
that we will use the FTA, the best fitted model, in order to determine that risk. For
instance, if we see that cyber-attacks have increased in the last five years and that of five
hundred incident reports only forty were successful we can use logic to determine how
technology has advanced and if the maritime infrastructure has been updating their
security software programs. If programs have not been updated since the last attack, then
it can be safe to assume that future attacks will happen. However, if it is found that cyber
security has been increased, then we can use the probability that if attacks have been
occurring at the same rate with the same mechanisms, then the stronger security programs
could lessen the chances of a threat to the maritime security programs. The FTA is the
model that best fits for this critical infrastructure.
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Section Four: Recommendation as to which Risk Allocation Strategy Would Be Best
Suited for Maritime Security and the Port Security Grand Program (PSGP)
A report titled ―Maritime and Terrorism: Risk and Liability‖ was produced by the RAND
Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. RAND researchers discuss the likelihood
of terrorists striking maritime activities. There is potential impact on life, economy, and
leaves much room for civil liability against the United States government. RAND‘s risk
assessment primarily involves risks associated with attacks on passenger and container
shipping and originated ―from a broad assessment of related threats and vulnerabilities,
based on a combination of historical data regarding previous attacks, and on a series of
interviews with counterterrorism experts. [They] then investigated the likely
consequences that would follow from different modes of attack, drawing on historical
data and publicly available analyses, and by framing those consequences in terms of
human effects (e.g., casualties), economic effects (e.g., property damage and business
disruption), and intangible effects (e.g., political and governmental responses). Finally,
[they] combined the information on threat, vulnerability, and consequences to generate
estimates of relative risk, in connection with attack scenarios involving ferries, cruise
ships, and container shipping. [The] qualitative method for generating these risk
estimates involved the use of defined ordinal scales to assess terrorists‘ intents and
capabilities, target vulnerabilities, and attack consequences‖ (RAND, 2006) .

Particularly with shipping ports, risks are not easily recognizable due to the fact they can
vary from explosives, to natural disasters, to human errors. In this case, a policy maker
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determines allocation of budget to threat countermeasures. As strategy to use for the
shipping port example (NY/NJ), the apportion risk reduction method would be ideal for
the following reasons:

Easy to implement
Incorporates political issues
Corporate/organizational structure
Time line - schedule constraints
How efficiently budgets can be utilized
The DHS U.S. Coast Guard Congressional Justification for FY 2011 identifies savings
associated with targeted management and technology efficiencies and consolidation
initiatives. Specifically, ―The Coast Guard will continue to leverage available
efficiencies to maximize service delivery and provide the nation with the highest possible
return on investment. Proposed efficiency highlights include small boat logistics
management improvements, contract insourcing, headquarters management efficiencies,
and the consolidation of intelligence fusion centers under a single operational command.‖
The budget includes reallocation of ―Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), and
realignment of existing rotary wing (i.e., helicopter) capacity to the Great Lakes region.
For example, the Coast Guard will decommission four HECs and four HU-25 Falcons in
FY 2011. Additionally, the Coast Guard will implement a regionalized MSST operational
construct‖ (Department of Homeland Security: US Coast Guard, 2011). The MSSTs will
be decreased from twelve to seven teams in which resources will be apportioned to higher
commanding officials in order to address ports that are at the highest risks.
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The risk reduction method could be readily used for the NY/NJ shipping ports simply
because of dense population and the amount of critical infrastructure that surrounds these
ports. We have to recognize the developments of other CI/KR in order to assess whether
budgetary constraints will either help maritime security or whether will deter agencies
and stakeholders from continuing and advancing security measures. In this case, it
allows for the reallocation of assets to other agencies so they can utilize those funds to
assist in securing ports.

Along with these risk assessments come investment strategies. One particular investment
strategy comes from the DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It is
known as the Port Security Grand Program (PSGP) and it provides funding for
transportation infrastructure security which includes maritime port authorities. This
investment strategy supports wide risk management, creates better training programs,
expands recovery capabilities, and assists in deterring attacks involving explosives and
cyber-attacks. ―The PSGP implements objectives addressed in a series of post-9/11 laws,
strategy documents, plans, Executive Orders (EOs) and Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPDs). Of particular significance are the National Preparedness Guidelines
and its associated work products, including the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) and its sector-specific plans. The National Preparedness Guidelines provide an
all-hazards vision regarding the nation‘s four core preparedness objectives: prevent,
protect, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and catastrophic natural disasters.
In addition, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 is aimed at strengthening the security
and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose
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the greatest risk to the security of the nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks,
pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. At the regional port level, Area Maritime
Security Plans (AMSPs), Port-Wide Risk Mitigation Plans (PRMPs), Facility Security
Plans (FSPs), and analytical products such as the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
(MSRAM) are used in support of the NIPP by identifying critical security needs specific
to a port area. Area Maritime Security Committees, which are comprised of port
stakeholders representing all levels of government and the port industry, use these
various plans and tools to prioritize funding needs and rank port security project
proposals‖ (FEMA, 2011) .

The chart below shows the available funding for FY 2011 (FEMA, 2011).
Table 1: FY 2011 PSGP

FY 2011 PSGP Funding

Available Funding Group
Group I

$141,017,400

Group II

$70,508,700

Group III

$11,751,450

All Other Port Areas

$11,751,450

TOTAL

$235,029,000

This investment strategy is specific and addresses components necessary to advance the
operation and security measures for maritime shipping ports. Guidelines set forth by
FEMA indicate that we have already begun to recognize the important of budgets and
investing in personnel and technology.
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Section Five: Analyzing the Impact of Safeguards on the Internet of Maritime Security
Cyber-attacks against the United States have become more recent with the advancement
and accessibility of computers. We have seen hackers infiltrate some of the most
restricted locations of the government including the Defense Department and the CIA.
We cannot afford to jeopardize one of the most vulnerable critical infrastructures which
maintain free trade and the global economy. Hackers such as ―Anonymous‖ have
proclaimed themselves undefeatable, able to access any sensitive information, and
infringe upon classified information. As one of the marquee countries able to combat
terrorism, we will have to analyze the safeguards that are set in place to counter such
threats. In order to combat these threats the United States must look to coordinate with
other port security agencies worldwide. Communication, the streamlining of documents
and sensitive information, and the use of operating machinery via an online connection
are deemed security risks to maritime port security. The Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a program that has been utilized to help increase security
for maritime shipping cargo to the United States and around the world. There are now
online reporting hotlines, which are streamlined connections for any information
regarding threats against shipping vessels or the ports. This is known as the Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE). ACE does the following:
Allows trade participants access to and management of their trade information via
reports
Expedites legitimate trade by providing CBP with tools to efficiently process
imports/exports and move goods quickly across the border
Improves communication, collaboration and compliance efforts between CBP and
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the trade community
Facilitates efficient collection, processing and analysis of commercial import and
export data
Provides an information-sharing platform for trade data throughout government
agencies.

In a February 8, 2012 report by the CBP, it is said that ACE ―is the United States
commercial trade processing system designed to automate border processing, to enhance
border security and foster our nation's economic security through lawful international
trade and travel. ACE will eventually replace the current import processing system for
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Automated Commercial System (ACS).
ACE is part of a multi-year CBP modernization effort that is being deployed in phases‖
(ACE, 2012). These and similar designs create information that is streamlined and more
secure because of the steps of approval it must go through to have cargo enter the United
States.

Section Six: Analyzing Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA and
Identifying

the Threats and Vulnerabilities

The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions (SCADA) has been faulty because of its
failure to keep up with current threats. Maritime security has been known to withstand
and deter threats; however, with SCADA systems information is usually within confined
units. With the use of cameras, metal detectors, radiation detectors, and security CCTV
personnel there is a primary concern with how to advance in technology while catering to
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the prevention of cyber-threats. SCADA systems have been placed on ships and collect
data and send it via an electronic communication line.

Threats remain at a high rate with these SCADA systems because agencies have been
unable to keep up with the advancement of technological threats. A hearing before the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the United States Senate in
February 2010 discussed how SCADA protocols ―used in control systems were not
designed to be attack resistant; they were originally used in electromechanical systems,
where you had to physically access the control, turn the knob, and so on.‖ It is now
believed to have control systems with unique identification numbers that connect with
one another via the internet. Threats to SCADA systems are significant and the United
States can no longer rely solely upon these systems to keep mechanisms secure or use
them as deterrents from cyber-attacks. In the same report it was suggested that there are
advancements the government can make with SCADA:
1. We should insist on some standards, through existing standards bodies, of Smart
Grid components. NIST, for example, has led a cyber-security working group that
recently released a second draft of Smart Grid Cyber security Strategy and
Requirements document.
2. We need better transparency on how Smart Grid components are built and of what
they are built. There are some mechanisms that can help establish transparency
such as the Common Criteria, which is ISO-standard, and the Department of
Homeland Security materials on improving software assurance and acquisition
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(Committee On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate,
2010).

With respect to maritime and the shipping ports, DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard must be
able to access information on the status of shipping vessels from a remote location. In
order to do that, SCADA would have to be upgraded to current GPS tracking signals.
SCADA‘s risk and threat to being hacked will have to be monitored by a technology
group responsible for making sure secure measures are in place to monitor vessels. As
cargos approach shipping ports, it is important to inventory freights so that the
government has information on the cargo and reports are readily available. In recent
years, SCADA has become more advanced; however, it is still stagnant compared to
other state of the art technologies. CCTV Monitors, GPS trackers, technology groups
solely responsible for monitoring shipping vessels via upgraded SCADA systems could
great increase the security levels of maritime security.

Section Seven: Conclusion and the Assessment for 2012 and Beyond
Though we cannot prevent every terrorist or cyber-attack, security has been put into place
since September 11th and has been reanalyzed on numerous occasions. All agencies and
private sector entities have one common goal related to threats: deterrence. Security
measures that are implemented online, in the waters, and on land all have to do with
better safeguarding our homeland, our citizens, and our critical infrastructures. Maritime
port security is one that has been addressed less frequently than that of other critical
infrastructures. However, safeguarding the ports is a matter of safeguarding the global
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economy and free trade. All critical infrastructures are related and all share common
threats. We have been able to address the problems associated with maritime security
and we are now developing more strategies to counter threats as they advance.

As for what will happen beyond 2012, it is up to our management policies and strategic
analyzers who continually gather information and compare the current threats against
past data. Advisory councils, local government assistance, streamlined online cargo
control, and better training exercises all add to the advancement of securing our borders.
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CHAPTER VII

United States Shipping Ports and Megacommunity
Multi-Disciplinary Approaches
Executive Summary
The purpose of analyzing megacommunities and the U.S. Maritime entities is to offer
insight as to how maritime security is sustained through the following entities:
stakeholders, government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO‘s) and
citizens. Terrorist threats and natural disasters which threaten the U.S. coasts, including
shipping ports, are unpredictable and with a thorough analysis we can systematically
implement strategies which involve a tri-factor leadership response that can disseminate
information and communicate efficiently. The strategy to improving the
megacommunity involves much of the public because they are an integral part of
sustaining the safety and security of the nation‘s maritime assets.

Introduction
The United State Maritime structure consisting of shipping vessels and shipping ports are
at risk for terrorist attacks and natural disasters. However, none has occurred yet. The
concern a megacommunity has encompasses the public sector stakeholders, private sector
stakeholders. Disasters from natural events, human error, or terrorist attacks can result in
damage far more widespread than just the disaster site itself. A chemical attack,
hurricane, or other terrorist attack could have the potential of impacting an entire nation.
The loss of a shipping port could cost the country of up to $1 trillion in damages. The
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closure of a shipping port could have detrimental effects on the nation‘s economy, global
economy, affecting those who are employed in such industries. The megacommunity
vital to the security of the nation‘s maritime assets involves the following stakeholders:
1. Public: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, FEMA, U.S.
Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Transportation, and state port
authorities;
2. Private: Oil factories, airports, shipping companies, trucking companies,
companies operating along rail lines.

It is not only important to consider the megacommunity among the private, public, and
NGO‘s, it is important to include the public so that we understand the impacts citizens
may endure should a disaster strike our maritime assets. In order to obtain a sufficient
understanding as to how the megacommunity strategies affects the safety and security of
the nation‘s maritime assets and its citizens, an analysis of the following is critical:
1.

advisory groups and how they can help a megacommunity develop better
emergency response times

2. ways to resolve conflicts in a megacommunity when opposing views threaten to
weaken relationships amongst sectors and stakeholders
3. involving the public for better communication

Through these three sections we will be able to grasp a better understanding as to how
stakeholders and the public can cooperate to provide safer havens for people and the
country‘s maritime assets.
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Section One: Understanding How Advisory Groups Assist Emergency Response
Communications
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina proved to be an example of how communication
failures resulted in hundreds of deaths and billions of dollars worth of damages. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was considered a failure with
resources and emergency responses arriving too late. Media and public scrutiny left the
federal government scrambling for answers. Natural disasters are unpredictable but
emergency response groups must be ready to activate necessary actions in order to
mitigate a disaster when it occurs. The Community and Regional Resilience Institute
(CARRI) Gulfport Advisory Group is an example of how the state of Mississippi joins
both the public and private sectors to contribute their resources and ideas. During
Katrina, consequences were overlooked. ―Emergency plans foresaw cell phone
communication as one layer in a redundant communication system. Emergency
responders, including police, would oversee public safety with available emergency
vehicles, while households would stockpile food and water, and the Red Cross would
supply back-up source emergency rations. These plans failed as there was no anticipation
of disrupted landlines and emergency communications that prompted an overwhelming
demand on the undamaged cell-phone relay towers. With power off, emergency vehicles
could not be refueled, and some emergency responders redirected their efforts to
evacuating and caring for their own families. The possibility that the Red Cross would
not be able to enter the city was not anticipated, nor the desperation and looting that
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followed the exhaustion of meager food and water stockpiles while the officials
blockaded entry of additional emergency supplies‖ (Colten, 2008). The diminished
communication lines led emergency response workers to act for themselves; other
helpless individuals were left fending for themselves without any communication lines or
way out of the waters surrounding their residences.

Advisory groups are developed so that communication lines can remain open and sustain
operability. There are reasons why an advisory group can be resourceful in providing
security to our maritime assets:
1. it improves communication and collaboration across all sectors
2. it describes how individuals and families have the ability to prepare for disasters
3. it increase resources for post-traumatic stress for individuals who have been in
disasters
4. it preserve the way to restore an area to the way it was prior to the disaster

The way we choose to mitigate a natural disaster or an attack against the United States
depends upon how a megacommunity reacts. Megacommunities can be successful with
an advisory group to take care of underlying factors of potential consequences and the
aftermath of such consequences. Just as every president needs a cabinet to sustain
operability so does a megacommunity. The maritime plays a crucial part in sustaining a
global economy and free trade. Shipping vessels vulnerable to chemical and radiological
attacks could affect not only the resources being shipped but as well as the surrounding
communities. The ports of New York and New Jersey are excellent examples of how
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docks are surrounded by dense populations, oil storage, and one of the world‘s biggest
financial centers.
With the advancement of technology, the critical infrastructure within the United States
has had to develop new strategies to accommodate threats that were not considered a
security risk before. However, the United States must also consider technological threats
to infrastructure at sea. Shipping and ports on land are vulnerable to threats on a global
scale. Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and cyber-threats are just some of the main
concerns that need to be considered when developing safeguards.

The Transportation Sector-Specific Plan for the Maritime Model Implementation Plan
indicates that organizations with outside stakeholders are important to sustaining other
critical infrastructures such as the economy, travel, banking and finance industries.
―Maritime model stakeholders are formalizing new coordination processes using the
Sector Partnership Model espoused in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
The Maritime Model Government Coordinating Council (MMGCC) has been formed‖
(Transportation Sector-Specific, Sec. 5). The development of these councils and
partnerships is a vital example of how we can control certain interdependencies by using
advisory councils to speak on these agencies‘ behalf. It is useful to have multiple areas
that control one sector of a critical infrastructure. In this case, councils are utilized to
correspond with interdependent entities while the agencies themselves are responsible for
implementing the security measures.
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Section Two: Ways to Resolve Conflict in a Megacommunity, especially when Opposing
Views Threaten to Weaken the Relationships
To strengthen working relationships amongst private and public stakeholders, we have to
develop continuous exercises which require the sectors to work together. One example
was the idea of tabletop exercises presented by Richard Andrews, the Senior Director for
Homeland Security Projects, National Center for Crisis and Continuity Coordination.
―One step that any organization can take to reach out to other public and private entities
in its region is to conduct joint tabletop exercises. In contrast to full-scale training
exercises that require physical deployment and response during a simulated crisis
environment, the tabletop framework focuses on strategic planning, tactical safety and
response drills.‖ This develops better working relationships amongst sectors but it also
involves the public for better awareness. ―Tabletop exercises can provide an effective
forum for public- and private-sector organizations to discuss a full range of crisisresponse issues. The exercises are designed to determine the level of coordination and
communication readiness of several organizations in response to a variety of manmade
and natural emergency situations, such as an escalation in the Homeland Security
Advisory System‖ (Andrews, 2003).

Section Three: Involving the Public to Sustain Better Communication Efforts
To preserve an area that once held its own culture and history and quality, it is important
that we try out best to have these cities retain citizens and continue to grow and prosper.
Public forums give communities a sense of involvement with better insight as to how
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citizens can sustain their livings with the resources available to them. A megacommunity
which involves private security stakeholders as well as industrial stakeholders responsible
for the outsourcing materials to other countries via shipping vessels could struggle
without the understanding of communities surrounding these ports. Although federal and
state stakeholders have provided tools and reports to grasp an understanding of public
awareness, it is important to involve the public so that we learn how to sustain these
communities.

There are a few ways in which the public could be informed and involved with sustaining
the safety and security of maritime assets and surrounding ports:
1. Monthly newsletters with dates and times of meetings
2. Funds available to enhance security
3. Focus on public questions and concerns via surveys and a current
questions/comments hotline
The Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) have been described as
one of the only ―community forums for the sharing of information among public and
private entities in crisis situations. These organizations primarily focus on
communication within a specific industry and are often unable to provide members with
the type of timely emergency information that national or state-level organizations would
be able to provide‖ (Andrews, 2003).

Andrews also address the concerns of privacy and liability. They must be addressed to
prevent classified information from being shared with the public. ―The public-sector
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organizations we work with value the benefits of information sharing, [but] some
companies are hesitant to collaborate in crisis communications due to the potential legal
ramifications of sharing potentially incomplete or inaccurate information. A baseline
standard of acceptable good citizen information sharing must be established to prevent
the threat of legal action from blocking vital collaboration between the public and private
sectors.‖

Public forums and involvement give a good idea of how a megacommunity approach will
work. For example, in the private sector a store does not know how to handle its
customers without feedback. They cannot simply guess how consumers will maneuver
themselves around a store without some kind of organization of departments. If they are
scattered, then there could be confusion and disruption amongst shoppers. This can cause
longer lines, more questions as to where items are located and crowdedness. However,
with feedback from the consumers, department heads could revamp their organization‘s
structure so that customers may shop more efficiently with little disruption. We can
apply the same idea of effective preparedness to the government‘s critical infrastructure.
Without proper evacuation or security procedures intact, agencies cannot expect the
public to immediately comply and react the way they may ―think‖ they will; public
forums and their involvement is merely a way to ensure that they are well informed on
evacuation procedures and are able to take proper safety measure to advert disastrous
events such as those of Hurricane Katrina.
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Conclusion
RAND researchers discuss the likelihood of a scenario in which terrorists could strike
maritime activities. There is potential impact on life and the economy, and leaves room
for civil liability against the United States government. RAND‘s risk assessment
primarily involved risks associated with attacks on passenger and container shipping; it
―began from a broad assessment of related threats and vulnerabilities, based on a
combination of historical data regarding previous attacks, and on a series of interviews
with counterterrorism experts. [They] then investigated the likely consequences that
would follow from different modes of attack, drawing on historical data and publicly
available analyses, and by framing those consequences in terms of human effects (e.g.,
casualties), economic effects (e.g., property damage and business disruption), and
intangible effects (e.g., political and governmental responses). Finally, [they] combined
the information on threat, vulnerability, and consequences to generate estimates of
relative risk, in connection with attack scenarios involving ferries, cruise ships, and
container shipping. [The] qualitative method for generating these risk estimates involved
the use of defined ordinal scales to assess terrorists‘ intents and capabilities, target
vulnerabilities, and attack consequences‖ (RAND, 2006).

These vulnerabilities are critical and must be addressed on a regular basis. As time shifts
so does technology, and so it is the responsibility of a megacommunity to ensure that the
public and our critical infrastructure assets are secured and plans are accurately reflected
in reports to Congress. Although are no guarantees of safety, there are certainly steps
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that can be put in place to ensure that the public sector, private sector, and the public are
well informed and are aware of threats at the same time.
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CHAPTER VIII

The United States Department of Defense:

Securing Personnel Through Protecting the Infrastructure
Introduction
With the threat of terrorism very much still prevalent today, we have focused our
attention on areas outside of the Middle East. Since the September 11th attacks, the
United States has increased its counterrorism (CT) personnel throughout the world. Not
only have we allied with other countries to fight terrorism we have set up ―shop‖ in areas
that are prone to more terrorist attacks. In addition to extremist Islamic groups, we have
also focused on areas where drug trafficking is prevalent such as Columbia, Cuba,
Afghanistan, and within the U.S. According to iJET Intelligent Risk Systems, an agency
which maintains the security risks for 182 countries, the following ten countries reported
in2003 were at the highest risk of terrorism: (iJET)
Figure 1.1
Colombia

FARC declared war on the current
president because he vowed to rid the
country of terrorism. FARC has been
known to conduct kidnappings and
shootings which involve casualties of
civilians regardless of affiliation.
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Recent bombings in this country were due
to the Jemaah Islamiyah extremists which
operated cells in this country.

Israel

Terrorist groups, particularly Palestinian
terrorist groups were conducting mass
suicide bombings in busy areas. Hamas
was one of the main culprits in this
country; they were able develop
sophisticated methods that could hide under
the radar and thus succeed in their mission.

Kenya

This country has been an open area for Al
Qaeda due to the poor border controls in
place. With close proximity to other
countries in Africa it has been susceptible
to terrorist attacks.

Nigeria

This is an unstable nation; the national
population is 50% Muslim. With religious
and ethnic tensions the country is
susceptible to extremist groups operating
and developing terrorist cells.

Philippines

There have been several smaller attacks in
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this country; although common we have
not seen a great deal of attention regarding
CT.
Russia

Threats have always been prevalent in this
country. Militants outraged at the election
of Putin have carried out acts in Chechnya.
They aim for civilian targets making it one
of the most dangerous areas in Russia.

Spain

The ETA separatist group has been an
extreme threat to law enforcement and a
particular area of concern to those involved
with combating terrorism as they are the
targets.

Thailand

Tourists and foreign companies in this
country have been the main targets for
terrorists. It has a big effect on the
economy. Terrorists are capable of
committing large scale suicide attacks in
malls, restaurants, and large buildings.

Yemen

Al-Qaeda has developed massive numbers
of terrorist cells in this country. Because
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they are in remote locations it is almost
impossible to locate them.

A country of particular interest still relevant today on this list is Spain. We have to
consider the impact of both local and foreign law enforcement security personnel and the
security measures that must be sustained for them.
The purpose of this report is to determine how we can engage in CT efforts while
protecting the security and intelligence personnel assigned to this region. We will take
Spain as an example and use the Department of Defense (DOD) and their use of
infrastructure to consider whether or not these infrastructures are sufficient enough to
defend our personnel.
DOD Task
The task set for DOD is protecting personnel and the operating assets against any number
of threats. We will take into consideration the range of threats in the region and the
impact it will have on our CT measures as an enterprise.
This depends on how prepared we are and how fast we are able to respond to a warning
about what is threatening our security personnel. Management must consider three
aspects:
1. Determine how terrorism even at the most minimal security risk impacts the
organization;
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2. Assess and monitor these threats to see how our infrastructure and personnel are
impacted;
3. Direct and engage in an appropriate response.

Desired Results for the DOD
With proper knowledge and reaction we will be able to determine the threats to DOD
personnel, infrastructure, and other assets (e.g. employee and military vehicles, employee
residences, and documents). We will also be able to communicate with other U.S.
agencies and security forces within Spain to set warning systems against other threats that
affect our ability to conduct CT strategies. Finally, we wil be able to deploy emergency
responses in case an attack has been carried out.

Threats to DOD CT Personnel in Spain
The main threats in Spain are militant groups aimed at dismantling the security forces
within this country. It does not matter whether they are the local authorities or foreign
security forces. The Spain separatist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) is one of the
biggest threats to CT forces in this country. Their aim is to disable and dismantle the
government‘s security and law enforcement personnel and infrastructure. ETA has
established great unease in the Spanish government. Although the ETA has also aimed
its violence against tourists and other civilians, the majority of their victims involve
government officials.
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The Council on Foreign Relations states that the ―ETA‘s secular nationalist agenda has
nothing to do with the Islamist fundamentalism of Osama bin Laden‘s terrorist network,
and experts say there is no credible evidence of any systematic cooperation between ETA
and al-Qaeda‖ (http://www.cfr.org/france). Al-Qaeda, however, is found in parts of
Spain but is not considered to be a part of this particular separatist group. Because these
two entities are prevalent in Spain we have to keep in mind that they are a threat to both
the government and civilians at a very high rate.
The DOD must consider how to secure their personnel, particularly the noncombatant
personnel which include administrators, intelligence analysts, and communication posts.
Task 1: Determine How Terrorism Even At The Most Minimal Security Risk Impacts
The Organization
We have already established the two main terrorist groups that threatened the DOD
personnel and organization as a whole. Even as the ETA disappeared for a while in the
mid 2000‘s, security strategies for the government still did not change because Spain had
to stay on guard at all times. If there was an attack on DOD personnel and its
infrastructure, we would suffer severe consequences. Our intelligence would be
dismantled, our communication would be destroyed, and security forces would have to
increase their communication and intelligence efforts in an attempt to alleviate any
problem, making us prone to more attacks.
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Figure 1.2 below is an example of how DOD personnel can be updated with alerts and
threats so they can prepare for the worst. To avoid these mistakes of miscommunication
we have to understand how these types of attacks can impact our infrastructure and of
course, the most important assets of the U.S. Government, our personnel.

Figure 1.2
Live alerts that are messaged to individuals

These can be delivered to one‘s cell phone
or email address.

A system that allows military personnel to

This can be done by giving other assets to

track possible threats

other vulnerable countries and learning
from their advantages and disadvantages.

Increasing intelligence

The intelligence support at home can be
utilized as additional help to those serving
abroad

Continual briefs on intelligence

Every country should share intelligence
reports so that they can assess whether or
not two or more countries are experience
similar threats with the same organization.
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Task 2: Assess and Monitor These Threats to See How Infrastructure and Personnel Are
Impacted
If the ETA or Al-Qaeda makes a threat towards DOD personnel, we will have to consider
how we protect our team through determining whether or not our infrastructure is
sufficient. We do this by identifying the strategic issues. Strategically, an issue that
arises from a situation analysis is that of inner managerial controls. In order to place
strategic goals on an international basis we ensure that all internal controls within the
DOD are devoid of the internal weaknesses. There is little transparency among
governments, and obtaining cooperation from reluctant countries can make it difficult for
the United States to enforce its efforts into screening possible terrorist activities,
industries and the infrastructure. Another strategic issue is that of the timeline. Previous
strategic plans have not gone beyond five years, and given the advancement in
technology we must prepare these plans so that we can apply them over a ten year plan.

As administrations change, we have to maintain the strategic plan for at least a decade
before we can start seeing results in the long term. The DOD in conjunction with
governmental and private security stakeholders both at home and abroad will maintain
the strategy. For example, Goldman Sachs has an interest with foreign investments
throughout the world. If we can encourage transparency through transactions which
occur between countries that are most susceptible terrorism, we can decrease the threat of
extremists infiltrating these banking systems and destroying some of the most important
aspects of commerce. The same goes for weapons trading and drug trafficking. All these
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elements help us develop a better understanding as to which areas the money and/or
weapons are transported to, thus giving an idea where an attack might occur. We are
responsible for understanding how the infrastructure functions within foreign
governments.

Brian Jackson and David Frelinger wrote ―Emerging Threats and Security Planning with
the A RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environmental Program which frames a middle
ground approach to addressing possible threats. Meeting halfway in a proposal rather
than burdening a country with its own security forces is essential. ―Ideally, the national
approach to addressing possible future threats should strive to get as many of the
advantages of both ends of the spectrum—responding prudently to threats. . . but not
allowing doing so to threaten the effectiveness and sustainability of existing security
efforts by forcing planners to spend disproportionate time focusing on unlikely terrorist
scenarios. Analysts could use techniques such as risk analysis or cost/benefit analysis to
assess different threats and use their results as a common denominator to determine how
much we should worry about different possible attacks and the advisability of different
possible responses to them‖ (Jackson, Frelinger, 2009).

For example, as reported in FY 2010 Performance and Accountability Report, ―Treasury
served a leading role in establishing the Afghanistan threat finance cell (ATFAC). This is
a Kabul-based task force charged with collection, analysis, and dissemination of
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intelligence to disrupt funding and support for the Taliban and other terrorist and
insurgent networks in Afghanistan. It provides finance expertise to U.S. civilian and
military leaders and assists a
Afghan authorities have investigated insurgent terrorist financing, narcotics trafficking,
and government corruption. Through this assistance, ATFC has helped build the
capacity of Afghan authorities to operate independently, a key U.S. policy goal in
Afghanistan‖ (Performance and Accountability Report, 2010). The ultimate goal here is
to eliminate cyber threats within the infrastructure of our banking and finance industry.
For example, there are several strategic factors implemented by the Department of
Treasury to eliminate such threats; however, these goals are not 100% preventative, so
we must keep an ongoing effort to deter criminal acts from infiltrating our banking
infrastructure. This is an example of how we utilize intelligence to protect other
personnel from being harmed. It can be utilized in any form of security and infrastructure
program.
Task 3: Direct and Engage In an Appropriate Response
The DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Directive 2000.12 written in 2003 developed a
response as to how we are to evacuate noncombatant civilian employees from areas of
theat. Particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) AT responsibilities includes:
1. Establish and operate a Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism
(DIA/JITF-CT) to direct collection, exploitation, analysis, fusion, and
dissemination of all-source intelligence in support of DOD combating
terrorism operations, planning, and policy, including DOD AT requirements.
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The JITF-CT serves as the single national-level, all-source foreign terrorism
intelligence effort within the Department of Defense. The JITF-CT is
designated to serve as the central repository of all foreign terrorism-related
intelligence for the Department of Defense. Military Department Secretaries
and Service Chiefs shall conduct terrorism intelligence activities as a
component of or in consonance with the JITF-CT.
2. DIA/JITF-CT shall provide prompt dissemination of intelligence on foreign
terrorist threats, including specific warning of threats against DOD personnel
(including family members), facilities, and other DOD material resources.
Warnings to DOD Personnel (including family members) shall be in
accordance with the "No Double Standard" policy as defined in Enclosure 2.
The DIA/JITF-CT is the focal point within the Department of Defense for the
analysis of data and information pertaining to domestic and foreign terrorist
threats to DOD Personnel (excluding threats posed by U.S. persons who have
no discernable foreign control or connections).
3. Operate a 24-hour terrorism intelligence Warning and Fusion Center within
the JITF-CT; ensure terrorist threat intelligence is disseminated to the
appropriate DOD Components.
4. Send a representative to the Interagency Committee on Terrorism, and provide
the DOD input to the national intelligence foreign terrorism warning process.
5. Maintain a foreign terrorism database, which includes information on foreign
terrorist groups, capabilities, facilities, incidents, biographies, and foreign
counterterrorism policies and response capabilities.
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6. Subject to the provisions of References (aa) and (ab), assess the foreign
terrorist threat worldwide, ensure dissemination to the DOD components, and
produce daily foreign terrorist threat awareness reports.
7. Provide a member to the DOD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee
(ATCC) and subcommittees.
8. Function as the DOD Executive Agency for diplomatic security matters.‖
(Directive 2000.12)

All these responsibilities listed in the directives are a prime example of how we are to
establish protection for any noncombatant federal employees and their families from
threats of terrorism. There are controls in place for an evacuation. But prior to
evacuating such employees, we have to acknowledge the fact that we have learn to deter
the possibility of physical harm to these individuals. The Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection & Espionage of 2008 indicates, ―The threat to the United
States from foreign economic intelligence collection and industrial espionage has
continued unabated since the publication of the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2007. Economic espionage cases went up
slightly and nearly every day brought reports—in the press and in the classified world—
of new cyber-attacks against U.S. government and business entities. Additionally, the
increasing use of new modes of communication and social networking provided
uncharted opportunities for transferring information and spying on the part of
enterprising foreign intelligence services.‖ (http://cdse.dss.mil/counterintel)
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They also address the threat of technologies which in return can threaten the well-being
of DOD employees. Because of newly emerging technologies that are still in premature
stages, they are vulnerable to attacks. ―Many of these constitute Critical National Assets,
defined as systems, processes, technologies, or information that are of broad overriding
importance to the survival, safety, or vitality of the United States and that, if stolen,
modified, or manipulated by an adversary, would seriously threaten US national or
economic security. Often these technologies are difficult to identify in their early phases.‖
(Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage)

These examples are critical not only to protect our infrastructure but to also protect our
personnel. Military and noncombatant DOD personnel are severely at risk should one of
our infrastructures be infiltrated or destroyed in a country such as Spain. The Spanish
government will have to coordinate with U.S. military personnel in order to protect assets
of all types.

Conclusion
The security measures are an attempt to increase security abroad in order to increase
security at home, and it best to keep in mind that this is not only for the benefit for the
U.S. but also for other countries. We cannot simply set goals and objectives and expect
them to be followed by bodies outside of the United States. In 2008 the Department of
Defense (DOD) implemented a strategy to promote security on an international level.
Particularly they emphasize the importance of promoting security to prevent war. The
DOD seeks to prevent warfare by a strategy with the idea that ―the best way to achieve
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security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the
international system‖ (National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense). The
protection of our noncombatant employees is an active approach consistent with other
security measures. The United States in its many attempts to deter terrorism worldwide
must take measures to ensure that more strategies are being developed to address better
security measures.
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CHAPTER IX
Security Threat Assessment for the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority‘s
Subway System and the Security Risks Posed to Its Riders
New York City Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force
Intelligence Gathering

Introduction
In response to specific intelligence reports provided to the New York City Police
Department‘s Joint Terrorism Task Force (NYPD JTTF), the Department of Homeland
Security has determined that more security measures are required for major metropolitan
subway systems including New York City‘s Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA).
These measures are a result of intelligence gathered by the DHS and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Based on this specific threat information, the DHS and FBI have
determined implementation of new security measures will be deemed necessary for the
MTA and its riders. The completion of a threat assessment is necessary among available
agencies involved with the NYPD JTTF to counter such threats.

These measures are a result of assessments made by individuals connected to operations
of intelligence gathering within the DHS. Available information leads us to believe that
several groups either of or related to Al Qaeda terrorist organization are considering
multiple attacks at major MTA subway hubs. Specifically, Grand Central, Brooklyn
Bridge/City Hall, and Penn Station have been listed as main targets for the attack. The
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NYPD JTTF will conduct these assessments by comparing intelligence reports against
available law enforcement anti-terrorism databases and records.

Intelligence Overview
The following information is collected from the DHS and FBI for the individuals who
have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda and are involved with the threat assessments: full
name, aliases, date of birth, social security number (if any).
The information being collected is to facilitate security threat assessments within the
MTA subway systems. Individuals involved with this threat are vital in providing further
information as to whether or not there is similar danger to other mass transit systems in
the New York City vicinity and across the country. This information is to be used to
determine when these individuals intend to carry out such Mumbai-like attacks at the
aforementioned subway stations.

Knowns/Unknowns
We know these terrorists are capable of obtaining low-grade weaponry with an ability to
maneuver through subway stations in a swift manner. We have reason to believe their
ability to maneuver through the city is based on mapping and constant traveling on the
MTA subway systems prior to the date of attack. We must also consider the idea that
bomb making materials may be used in small backpack carry-ons and left on trains and/or
other areas of subway stations.
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We are unable to confirm whether or not these threats are affiliated with Al Qaeda or a
similar organization who shares the same ideology. We are also unable to identify how
many individuals are expected to attack, if they are of U.S. citizenship status, or if
intelligence reports suggest that these terrorists plan on attacking any other metropolitan
transit system in the country.

Lessons Learned from Mumbai Attacks
On December 13, 2001 terrorists entered the Indian Parliament; they claimed to be part of
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Although Pakistan denied that such a group is based in its
country, many Indians believe that the politicians needed to take a bigger role on
handling the issues coming out of Pakistan. Specifically, India declared that it will take
on a serious role in response to the terrorist attacks which affected hundreds of locals and
tourists. This even meant military force if necessary. The long standoff between Indian
and Pakistan has created concerns among the international community, and a military
action from India to Pakistan could lead to a massive war. The United States understands
the self-defense approach India would take should they attack Pakistan; but only if they
had failed in all attempts with diplomatic measures.

This terrorist organization is on the list of foreign organizations which the United States
government has included in its reports. In addition to Lashkar-e-Taibe, another terrorist
group, Jaish-E-Mohammed was also at the root of the Mumbai attacks (Lessons, 2009).
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LeT Ideology and Modus Operandi/Tactics:
LeT has made it clear that they are another strand of an Al-Qaeda like terrorist platform.
Their ideals are similar to Al-Qaeda: terrorize globally without hesitation and to enforce
ideals onto Western societies that do not share the same values or ideologies as their
Islamic faith.
Their motive for executing such an attack is to demonstrate how simple their tactics may
be in order to spread a message. They used low-tech weapons that produce vastly
disproportionate results. The Mumbai attack was sequential, highly mobile. It was a
departure from the by-now-common suicide bombings. But the tactics themselves were
simple—armed assaults, carjackings, and drive-by shootings, building take-overs,
barricades and hostage situations, things that we have seen before, but put together in this
impressive complex of attacks. The attack was carried out by just 10 men, armed with
easily obtained assault weapons, pistols, hand grenades, simple improvised explosive
devices, little more than the arsenal of a 1940s infantryman, except they had with them
21st century communications technology—cell phones, satellite phones, BlackBerrys,
and GPS locators. The attackers embedded themselves among civilians, using them not
only as hostages, but as shields to impede the responders and to maximize civilian
casualties. This is a tactic that we have seen elsewhere and that now we have to be
prepared for, that is, terrorists deliberately embedding themselves with civilians
to increase the ultimate body count as the response takes place‖ (Lessons, 2009 ).
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Furthermore, according to analysis that was done by the Mineta Transportation Institute,
―two-thirds of all of the terrorist attacks on surface transportation over the last 40 years
were intended to kill, and 37 percent of those attacks resulted in fatalities. Now that
compares with about 20 to 25 percent of terrorist attacks overall, suggesting that when
terrorists come to surface transportation, they do view it primarily as a killing zone.
Indeed, 75 percent of the fatal attacks involved multiple fatalities and 28 percent involved
10 or more fatalities. So the intent here clearly is slaughter‖ (Lessons, 2009).
Lessons and Implications
Hearings in Congress in 2009 specifically laid out the implications of the Mumbai attack.
There are at least four implications that led to a disastrous ending to the attacks:
1) The terrorists were in the hotel for several months, and posing as different guests;
they were taking picture and thus learning the layout of the hotel;
2) Police responders were not familiar with the hotel, which therefore made it
difficult to maneuver throughout the facility;
3) Management did not increase security measures despite threats that may have
been given by intelligence analysts;
4) There were many entrances and open stairways; making it easy for anyone to
roam through the hotel freely.
To counter such situations management and law enforcement should have in place the
following:
1) Advanced training for employees in the layout of the hotel and how to identify
suspicious activity;
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2) There must be coordination with local law enforcement and
management/employees of the hotel in order to disseminate information quickly
as a threat develops;
3) Security must be increased, and the security personnel must be able to analyze
intelligence reports and even develop them so they can be communicated to law
enforcement;
4) Areas should be strictly monitored and secured. There should not be any open
stairways and doorways. Cameras and security guards should be in place in areas
which are not regularly checked.

The implications and lessons that need to be learned from the attack in Mumbai are that
we need to ensure emergency response to be as quick as possible. The Interagency
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group annual report to Congress in 2011 offers
ways in which we can maintain a strong force, better communication, and safer grounds
in areas such as subway systems.

Strengthen and Manage Oversight
Here the ITACG suggests that, ―The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (IRTPA), as amended, established the position of a Program Manager to ‗plan for
and oversee the implementation of, and manage‘ the Information Sharing Environment
(ISE), and to be ‗responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government.‘"
Consistent with the direction and policies issued by the President, the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
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(OMB), the Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment (PM/ISE) issue
government-wide procedures, guidelines, instructions, and functional standards, as
appropriate, for the management, development, and proper operation of the ISE. In
strengthening the management and oversight of the ISE, the PM/ISE actively governs,
integrates performance and investment, engages stakeholders, and encourages a culture of
information sharing‖ (Paul, 2011).
This means the DHS, MTA, the NY DOT, and the NYPD JTTF must coordinate with
other local, state and tribal law enforcement authorities. Typically, non-federal
organizations do work with other subcommittees: the ITACG report states three such
entities which are non-federal organizations who coordinate closely with select ISA IPC
Sub-Committees and working groups (Paul, 2009):
• Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Committee (CICC) – Fusion Center Sub‐Committee
and the
SAR Sub‐Committee
• Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (GLOBAL) – Fusion Center
Sub‐Committee, SAR
Sub‐Committee, Information Integration Sub‐Committee (Standards Working Group)
• Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) – Information Integration
Sub‐Committee
(Assured SBU Network Interoperability Working Group)

Improve Information Sharing and Establish Standards for Responsible Information
Sharing and Protection
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This report states that ―the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) makes it clear the PMISE‘s responsibilities extend to addressing and facilitating
improved information sharing between and among the components of the Intelligence
Community (IC), the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as the Homeland Security
and law enforcement communities. In addition, the PMISE is required to address and
facilitate responsible information sharing between federal departments and agencies and
state, local and tribal governments; federal departments and agencies and the private
sector; and federal departments and agencies and foreign partners and allies. While
ensuring responsible information sharing between all of these mission partners, the
PMISE must also ensure the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
(P/CR/CL)‖ (Paul, 2009)‘ This guidance is to ensure that stakeholders, the DHS, and the
NYPD JTTF are coordinating in such a way that all information sharing is received at the
same time. Information sharing also includes the public in the way the MTA has
campaigned for with the campaign ―If you see something say something.‖ This not only
engages the private sector stakeholders but also the public who all take part in initiating
information sharing among law enforcement and MTA staff.

Intelligence Cycle, the Intelligence Community, and Fusing Law Enforcement
The intelligence cycle process consists of five steps: planning and direction, collection,
processing, analysis and production, and dissemination. This cycle is provided as a
means for assisting analysts, policymakers, and managers alike. The idea here is to have
policymakers pay attention to intelligence reports which may indicate imminent danger.
Too often we find that policymakers are compelled to reject certain intelligence
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information from the Intelligence Community (IC) simply because it does not contain
enough information to convince a policy maker of a decision. Human Intelligence is a
crucial part of what makes the Intelligence Cycle function, according to Mark Lowenthal,
author of ―Intelligence: From Secrets to Security.‖ Lowenthal depicts the IC as one that
does not receive much feedback from policymakers. He has indicated that as a means of
furthering information through the IC and the intelligence cycle that we create these
fusion centers such as the NYPD JTTF. He specifically states, ―The legal difficulty
encountered in the United States is inherent in the federal system, which places
responsibility for local law enforcement on the states and their cities or counties. As a
means of improving liaison between the federal and local levels, a series of fusion
centers, called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), have been formed, although the
majority of them tend to the be staffed by state law enforcement personnel. These are in
a rather early state of development and their ability to provide the desired liaison and
integration and future remains uncertain‖ (Lowenthal, p. 257). The increasing of JTTFs is
an efficient way to create a better communication center. We have created many since
September 11th and we are still in the process of revamping and renewing certain ideas so
that more information is streamlined.

Results and Outline of Security Measures of Threat Assessment on MTA Subway System
We must gather all JTTFs and create a public awareness so that they are integrated with
the communication and with law enforcement including the stakeholders. There needs to
be upgraded presence of law enforcement on both the NYPD JTTF and FBI governing
levels. There is a need to keep a close eye on suspicious activity through the security

AMERICA‘S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

- 133 -

monitoring system developed by the NYPD. All subway systems vulnerable to such
Mumbai-like attacks will need to be dealt with swiftly by means of quick communication
via the IC and the public. We must address, at minimum, the following emergency
responses set in place in underground areas of the MTA subway systems in case of ANY
emergency: fire systems and procedures, exits in case of natural disasters, how to handle
evacuations, what to do with a power failure, reporting these emergencies, and how to
increase security with the threat of terrorism.
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CHAPTER X

The United States Department of Homeland Security

Evaluating the Critical Infrastructure Program
Introduction
One of the nation‘s top priorities is the safety and stability of the United States‘
infrastructure both at home and abroad. As technology advanced throughout the years,
different components of infrastructure became closely linked. Prior to technological
advances, systems of our infrastructure were independent of one another. There was very
little linkage among them. However, with today‘s advances in technology they have
become linked through computer systems. Critical infrastructures such as oil,
telecommunication, gas, electricity, banking, nuclear plants, law enforcement and
emergency services are at a high risk should there be a cyber-attack on systems
responsible for maintaining these elements. The Cyberterrorism Defense Analysis Center
(CDAC) states that ―the threat of cyberterrorism to our technical infrastructure is real and
immediate. Computers and servers in the United States are the most aggressively targeted
information systems in the world, with attacks increasing in severity, frequency, and
sophistication each year. As our nation‘s critical infrastructure grows more reliant on
information technologies, it also becomes more exposed to attackers, both foreign and
domestic. These attacks can threaten our nation‘s economy, public works,
communication systems, and computer networks.‖ (FEMA)
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This report will evaluate the banking infrastructure of our nation, an element that is
extremely vulnerable to terrorist activities. The financing of terrorism has been an aim of
terrorists by laundering funds from one account to another. We need to make sure that
the threats have been strategically minimized; in order to determine that, we have to
evaluate the safety mechanisms already in place. The oversight of such areas falls under
the watchful eye of the U.S. Department of Treasury. It is extremely crucial for this
country and for others alike to secure and maintain the economy around the world. We
will have to strengthen relationships with stakeholders both on a domestic and
international level. Private sector entities responsible for protecting the areas of
cyberspace and contracts with the United States government will have to be improved.
Purpose
We will define four evaluation methods to determine whether or not the banking
infrastructure has in fact been improved since the attacks of September 11th.
Evaluation Overview
These evaluations are designed to improve the regulatory arrangements that are in place.
Because our time and resources are limited, it is necessary to obtain external research to
determine if there is improvement in security. According to the World Bank‘s Handbook
for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, ―A quick evaluation may take up to 5
person-days and could cost up to US$15,000‖ (Brown, Stern, Tenenbaum). Therefore we
will have to determine how to evaluate the banking infrastructure without spending too
many tax dollars.
First Evaluation Method: Collecting Data
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Collecting data is the simplest form of evaluation. When collecting data within the
banking system, you are essentially compiling information that is already stored in
banking databases. This requires only technical skill. Furthermore FDIC rules and
regulations require banks to collect certain information since September 11th. Title 31 of
the Money and Finance Law relates to the National Money Laundering and Related
Financial Crimes Strategy; it addresses enhancement of the role of the private financial
sector in prevention through partnerships between the private financial sector and law
enforcement agencies, including incentives to strengthen internal controls and to adopt
more effective policies industry wide. It also addresses the enhancement of
intergovernmental cooperation between the federal government and state and local
officials, including prosecutors and other law enforcement officials (GPO). This is very
effective in allowing agencies to collect data in order to find out which individuals,
groups, or companies are conducting illegal activities. The Treasury Department is
working with public and private sector partners to develop a method to continue to
monitor the activities of investors and banking clients. The Department of Homeland
Security and Department of Treasury‘s Banking and Finance Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as an input to the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan conducted in 2007 states, ―The process for developing these metrics will incorporate
collaboration and insights from sector participants, regulators, as well as other sectors‘
government and sector coordinating councils as appropriate. These include processes for
developing metrics to address vulnerabilities stemming from gaps in sector dependencies,
continuous improvement to the information-sharing framework, and unique challenges
posed by cyber-crime. The Treasury Department will coordinate with the FBIIC agencies
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and the FSSCC to validate, update, and implement these metrics‖ (DHS-Banking and
Finance).

Second Evaluation Method: Conducting an Analysis of Outside Stakeholders
For the FY 2012, the Treasury Department‘s new budget reflects a plan coordinated by
the government to seek more clearly developed objectives. Specifically, ―The
Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development – the culmination of months of
interagency research and debate – concludes that we should ‗redouble our efforts to
support, reform, and modernize multilateral development organizations most critical to
our interests,‘ and to that end, ‗renew our leadership in the multilateral development
banks.‘‖
Figure 1.1 reflects the budget requests and appropriations by the Department:

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2012

Approp.

CR Level

Request

Request
Full Numbers

Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth (MDBs)
International
Development
Association (IDA)
Int‘l Bank for
Reconstruction and

1,262.5

117.4

1,262.5

1,358.5

1,358,500,000

117,364,344
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Development
(IBRD)
Inter-American
Development Bank
(IDB and FSO)

102.0

102,018,035

Multilateral
Investment Fund
(MIF)

25.0 25.0

25.0

25,000,000

Inter-American
Investment
Corporation (IIC)

4.7 4.7

20.4

20,428,519

Asian Development
Bank (AsDB)

0.0 106.6

Asian Development
Fund (AsDF)

105.0 105.0

African
Development Bank
(AfDB)
African
Development Fund
(AfDF)
European Bank for
Reconstruction &
Development
(EBRD)
Subtotal

106,585,848
115.3

32.4

155.0 155.0

115,250,000
32,417,720

195.0

195,000,000

0.0

1,552.2 1,552.2

0

2,072.6

2,072,564,466

(Geightner, 2010)
Over the course of five years the intention is to improve strategic performance goals in
hopes of increasing international oversight while risks are minimized. Between $10
billion and $20 billion will be required. This number is based on estimated totals for
2010. An estimated $2 billion a year needed for development of stricter security
measures which require more personnel and contractors to oversee the process. Not only
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are we sustaining the security of banks in other countries, but we have to ensure that
commerce and other legitimate trades done through our banking systems does not
negatively affect the nation‘s economy.
In order to conduct an evaluation on an area like this we must evaluate the external
stakeholders who are responsible for coordinating with the U.S. government in securing
our banking infrastructure. Stakeholders include entities such as banks, investment firms,
hedge funds, and other entities both local and international. The method to evaluate
success in this is a survey to find out whether or not they have put effective regulations in
place post September 11th.. The following is a list of questions for such a survey:
1. What is the main function of this entity?
a. Banking
b. Investment Advisor/Manager
c. Hedge Fund
d. Governmental Agency
2. How many Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) were filed with the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) last year?
a. 10,000 or fewer; if so, the approximate number_______
b. 10,001-15,000
c. 15,001-20,000
d. 20,001 or more; if so, the approximate number_______
3. Of the Suspicious Activity Reports issued to FinCen approximately how many
were follow up by a governmental agency?
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a. fewer than 10; if so, the approximate number ________
b. 101-500
c. 501-1000
d. 1001 or more; if so, the approximate number _______
5. Does the firm or governmental agency have a written document pertaining to the Bank
Secrecy Act? If you are a governmental agency, is there a Memorandum of
Understanding with the appropriate agency?
6. How much is currently spent on upholding current FDIC rules and regulations?
7. Were there any indications of a terrorist activity within the past year? If so, explain.
8. Has the government opened investigations pursuant to possible terrorism activity?
9. How many individuals are assigned to detecting fraudulent activity within your firm,
agency?
10. How many managers are in charge of overseeing the operations of these security
measures?
11. Do you receive federal funding in order to enforce any of these rules and regulations?
If so, how much did the entity receive in the last fiscal year?
12. If the entity received funds, how much was used to enforce the regulations?
13. If the entity received funds, did you need to request more funding? If so, why?
14. How often do you report to the appropriate agency for updates and reports?
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15. What kinds of training are in place for personnel?
16. What are the credentials are required of an entry level candidate to work in the fraud
detection department?
17. What are the approximate salaries for individuals in these departments?
18. How often are you audited by FINRA or other government agency?
19. Is there documentation that must be provided as a result of the audit?
20. How many foreign clients do you have and in what countries?
21. How many open inquiries are there regarding suspicious activity?
22. Are you a fiduciary to any foreign investment accounts? If so, please attach
documents pertaining to fiduciary accounts.
23. Have there been any anonymous tips outside the firm/agency? If so, how many?
What was the subject of the tips?
24. Who are the outside auditors, and are they paid through private or tax dollars?
25. Are you aware of any suspicious activities involving funds being invested with hedge
funds and feeder funds?
These questions require the respective agency and/or firm to conduct a thorough analysis.
With the information compiled by these entities we will be able to develop an
understanding as to whether or not tax payer dollars have been well spent. This
procedure should be conducted on an annual basis in order to ensure not only compliance
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with how tax dollars are spent but also to determine if more or fewer tax dollars are
needed. These questions relate not only to counterrorism but also to financial fraud.
Bernie Madoff is an example of how he practically dismantled the economy with the
economic downfall of 2008. Every government agency involved with financial fraud
detected the investment red flags post-Madoff and was put on high alert thereafter. Such
red flag areas include:
a. Obscure auditors: feeder funds did not have an outside performance
audit
b. Unusual fee structures: no management fee for the Madoff funds,
unusual for a hedge fund‘s operations
c. Family influence: many of these family members controlled and
operated in key positions, thus keeping the fraudulent activities quiet
d. Inadequate staff: Madoff had nearly $17 billion under management
with only a few staff members
e. No registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
after 2006
f. Lack of Transparency: on site due diligence inspections for investors
were limited or even denied; no answers to questions regarding the
business or his investment strategies.
g. Unusual transfers: Towards year end, Madoff would invest the assets
in Treasury bills, a very unusual practice for hedge funds.
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Surveying areas of financial firms is not only important to ensure that funding terrorism
is eradicated but that the white collar crimes committed by individuals within this country
are also eradicated. Continuous surveying of these areas can keep us up to speed with
information and we can determine which controls need to be set in place in order to
ensure that these occurrences are minimized.
Third Evaluation Method: Collecting Basic Data through Practical Evaluation
When we attempt to compare data we have to first collect data that is both qualitative and
quantitative. The ―Handbook of Practical Program‖ discusses the various types of
evaluations that can be done.. One practical evaluation method is the use of logic
models. Specifically, a logic model ―is a draft document that captures how the program
works‖ (Hatry, Wholey, Newcomer). Figure 1.2.

Start Up Cost

Operational Cost

Quality of
resources for
management

Resources

Implementation

Leverage, if
any

Quality of
resources for
stakeholders

Reaches infrastructure
security measures
(computers, financials,
fraud detection)
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Outcome

Figure 1.2 is a basic model utilized to estimate whether or not the goal in fact was
reached. Because we do not have exact numbers at hand, we will input numbers to
determine if the cost was well measured and if we utilized the resources thoroughly.
This basic model can be extremely complex when dealing with large areas of the
infrastructure. The table above is a basic representation of how we can utilize this model
in order to ensure that ration of cost and goals are equal and successful.
Conclusion
Evaluating a governmental infrastructure is quite complex and requires a multitude of
procedures. In this case, I have described three which I believe best suit the banking
infrastructure. We must make sure that our goals are not overfunded or underfunded;
additionally, we will have to acknowledge the fact that we will need to be transparent in
our findings to the public. They need to be aware of all the funding going to various
aspects of a governmental security measures.
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CHAPTER XI
Special Topics In Homeland Security
Bio-Nuclear Weapons and Maritime Infrastructure:
The Threats and the Prevention of Bioterrorism

INTRODUCTION
In recent years terrorists have become more sophisticated with their tactics involving
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), technology, and their advancement in the training
and smuggling of persons and weapons through techniques including money laundering,
illegal immigration, and fraud. For the purposes of sustaining healthy human life
amongst communities, particularly the United States, we have become increasingly more
concerned with the threat of biological weapons being transported via cargo vessels.

Maritime security has been an area which has caused great concern and debate amongst
politicians as to how secure our nation‘s ports are and if we are doing enough to protect
our maritime infrastructure. This last chapter discusses the implications of a potential bioterrorist attack. The United States will need to evaluate the following:
1. Most vulnerable ports and effects to homeland security and our nation‘s citizens;
2. Security measures the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), and other stakeholders are implementing into our maritime ports.

Threats of bio-nuclear and bio-chemical attacks could prove to be one of the most
devastating events to hit since September 11th, 2001. Extremists have been using
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technology and other methods to create chaos amongst western countries. The United
States has become concerned with the possibility that a similar attack could occur on U.S.
soil using devices similar to the IED‘s used in the Madrid and London attacks. New
techniques involve smaller attacks which occur simultaneously at multiple locations. We
cannot dismiss potential threats even if they seem to be ―far-fetched.‖ The following
sections will give insight into the threats, the potential effects on human life and our
maritime borders.

I.

VULNERABILITY OF OUR PORTS

On April 6, 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on
maritime security and its efforts to address reinforced security measures to our nation‘s
ports. It stated that the DHS predicts our ports support more than $700 billion of
commerce each year. Any disruption could severely impact the economic health of this
country and alter relationships with countries we trade with the most.

The USCG and the DHS are responsible for maintaining strategies implemented along
our ports. Other stakeholders include private trading companies and worldwide
governmental agencies which are responsible for securing the cargo as it ships to the
United States. However, human error does happen and we cannot be certain that every
container arriving into the United States has been checked for bombs, weapons, drugs, or
other chemicals. The 2012 GAO report indicates that ―As the lead federal agency for the
Marine Transportation System (MTS), the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for facilitating
the recovery of the MTS following a significant transportation disruption, such as a
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security incident or natural disaster, and working with maritime stakeholders for the
expeditious resumption of trade. Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans, which are
developed by the Coast Guard with input from applicable governmental and private
entities, serve as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures
related to prevention, protection, and security response, as well as facilitation of MTS
recovery. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard conducted efforts to
identify additional recovery-related elements and incorporate them within its AMS Plans
to help ensure a consistent approach to MTS recovery and trade resumption. In addition,
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) required that
AMS Plans include a Salvage Response Plan to ensure that waterways are cleared and
port commerce is reestablished as efficiently and quickly as possible following a
transportation security incident (TSI), among other things‖ (GAO, Maritime 2012).

This report makes clear that the DHS and the USCG among other stakeholders have a
good handle on how to maintain security throughout our coastlines. However, we must
understand and evaluate how human life is affected should there be an incident involving
explosives, or bio-chemical weapons. This includes medical emergency response,
communication response, evacuation response, and stakeholder mitigation response.
Radiological blasts entering dense area coasts such as New York and New Jersey could
be disastrous for a population at large.

With an estimated eight to ten million New Yorkers in the metropolitan area including,
Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and areas along New Jersey,
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there are obvious concerns as to how we will be able to deliver emergency responses to
these communities. With the population outnumbering emergency response centers by
the millions, there is no way to tell how long it will take to dispatch and rescue countless
number of citizens that could be affected by a bio-chemical or radiological attack. Given
the close proximity of the ports to these dense populations, there is a need to acquire
proper emergency response systems to mitigate a disaster site of this magnitude.

II.

DIRECTIVES AND THREATS

The way chemical attacks infiltrate one internal system could be difficult to determine.
Unlike explosive attacks, chemical attacks may not be visible to physical well-being.
Predicting the outcome of a bio-nuclear attack is dependent upon information provided
by intelligence agencies. The National Security Presidential Directive-43 (NSPD) and
the Homeland Security presidential Directive-14 (HSPD) responds to any given domestic
nuclear threats and the detections of such threats. There are specific goals in maintaining
the safety and deterrence of having such attack occur: ―To protect against the
unauthorized importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of a
nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in the United States,
and to protect against attack using such devices or materials against the people, territory,
or interests of the United States‖ (NSPD, 2005)

Figure 1.1
NSPD-43 AND HSPD-14 (NSPD, 2005)
Continue to develop, deploy, and enhance

Threats to maritime will increase if we fall
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national nuclear and radiological detection
capabilities in an effort to better detect,
report on, disrupt, and prevent attempts to
import, possess, store, transport, develop,
or use such devices and materials

behind with the most up to date
information on how terrorists may plan on
launch a bioterror attack against the U.S. in
our maritime infrastructure.

Continue to enhance the effective
integration of nuclear and radiological
detection capabilities across Federal, State,
local, and tribal governments and the
private sector for a managed, coordinated
response

Because this is a global transportation
mechanism, agreements with agencies in
other countries help benefit our strategic
responses to potential threats against the
U.S.

Continue to advance the science of nuclear
and radiological detection through an
aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and
transformational program of research and
development in such detection technologies

The use of private stakeholders that
specialize in bio nuclear technology
become important assets to the nation‘s
security. To understand how biological
and nuclear agents are launched and how
they affect the nation are critical in
sustaining human life.

In addition to these directives, former president George W. Bush signed the HSPD-18 in
2007 regarding countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which
include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents (CBRN). Biodefense in the
21ST century has been growing rapidly. HSPD-18 addresses the countermeasures that
should be implemented in a way without giving way to panic amongst government
agencies. We must acknowledge that any form of detection, deterrence, and
advancement in nuclear weapons must be treated differently as each scenario may require
unique responses. This directive addresses such matters in that, ―It is not presently
feasible to develop and stockpile medical countermeasures against every possible threat.
The development of vaccines and drugs to prevent or mitigate adverse health effects
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caused by exposure to biological agents, chemicals, or radiation is a time-consuming and
costly process.‖ In other words, we have to ensure that each countermeasure and its
researching efforts build on the nation‘s objectives in combating such threats. In doing
so, the HSDP-18 suggests four objectives which address the countermeasures of WMDs:
Figure 1.2 (HSPD-18)
Target threats that have potential for
catastrophic impact on our public health
and are subject to medical mitigation
Yield a rapidly deployable and flexible
capability to address both existing and
evolving threats
Are part of an integrated WMD
consequence management approach
informed by current risk assessments of
threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities
Include the development of effective,
feasible, and pragmatic concepts of
operation for responding to and recovering
from an attack

In maritime area threats include the
smuggling to weapons onto cargo ships
from international ports that have weak
security measures in place
The USCG is the front line responder
guarding our waters so must acquire
advance knowledge on CBRN‘s and the
threat of exposure to these CBRN‘s
Experts of WMDs may assist the USCG on
board if necessary

The communication lines between medical
emergency response agencies and the DHS
are crucial in order to sustain best
emergency response times

Simply put, many objectives, visions, and strategies have been discussed throughout
these preparations; however, we must focus on how we could mitigate an attack should it
occur on U.S. soil. The response time and administration of emergency services depends
on the communication, and transportation of vehicles, equipment, and personnel.

III.

HOW WE RESPOND TO AN ATTACK

Structurally, our emergency response teams are trained to go into the field and sustain
injuries to individuals in the shortest time possible. Timing is crucial. During September
11th, the FDNY and NYPD were criticized for having poor emergency communication
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channels open which caused chaos amongst the injured. Part of the reason internal
communication channels were inoperable was because the number of calls dialing into
the emergency response systems were overriding the systems and causing a jam.
Emergency channels used the same towers as used by the general public. Between the
use of cell phones, land lines, and emergency communication channels it was nearly
impossible to answer every call that was coming into these response centers.

CBRN‘s are one of the most dangerous weapons known to man. The spread of
radioactive material is extremely dangerous and we have to be able to respond to a threat
that may be seen in the future. Other biological and chemical threats are toxic enough to
spread viruses across stateliness. HSPD-18 addresses these types of agents and the
impact of how dangerous it is to a human population.
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Figure 1.3
BIOLOGICAL THREATS:

RESULT:

(a) Traditional Agents: Naturally
occurring toxin such as anthrax

Mass casualties.

(b) Enhanced Agents: Modified agents
made from natural toxins.
(c) Emerging Agents: Unrecognized
pathogens that might be naturally occurring
such as the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS).

Difficult to eradicate

Threat to human life with minimal tools
available to mitigate these agents.

(d) Advanced Agents: Of biological
nature that engineered in a laboratory to
bypass traditional countermeasures or
produce a more severe or otherwise
enhanced spectrum of disease.
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL
AGENTS:

Tools are not developed yet to detect and
control man-made agents thus causing
severe outbreaks with little treatment.

(a) Improvised Nuclear Devices:
Radioactive materials designed to result in
the formation of a nuclear-yield reaction.

Creating mass nuclear reaction reaching
more areas than a localized community.

(b) Radiological Dispersal Devices:
Devices, other than a nuclear explosive
device, designed to disseminate radioactive
material.

Creates chaos and pressures emergency
crews to mitigate the situation.

RESULT:

Could cause nationwide contamination.

(c) Intentional Damage or Destruction of a
Nuclear Power Plant: Damage to a reactor
core and destruction of the containment
facility of a nuclear reactor could
contaminate a wide geographic area with
radioactive material.

CHEMICAL THREATS:

Toxic Industrial Materials and
Chemicals: Solid, liquid, or gaseous form
(a)

Infiltration of these chemicals could lead to
simultaneous attacks in a metropolitan
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that are used or stored for use for military
or commercial purposes.

area.

(b) Traditional Chemical Warfare Agents:
Nerve agents historically developed
for warfighter use.

Physically debilitating materials could also
be used on simultaneous attacks.

(c) Non-traditional Agents: Chemical
threat agents or toxicants requiring adapted
countermeasures.

Similar to warfare agents, this requires
developing countermeasures.

If we are faced with an attack like this, the two most important elements are emergency
response times and emergency response teams. Triage facilities, hospital vacancies,
communication channels between government agencies and emergency response centers
are crucial in addressing the most severe cases. We cannot afford to lose communication
amongst these entities because of the time constraints and difficulty of managing a
CBRN attack. There are four key factors which must work in order to facilitate a disaster
site:
1. Hospitals must have plans;
2. Emergency call centers must have ample space to communicate amongst
emergency response teams and government offices;
3. USCG must be able to stop incoming shipments from sea to prevent any possible
future attacks;
4. We must have an abundance of vaccinations, tools, and equipment on site to work
a triage center during a disaster.
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The GAO‘s report on hospital preparedness addresses the capacity for bioterrorism
response. It also addresses the limited training personnel have to identify and diagnose
biological agents. ―Almost all hospitals reported participating in a local, state, or regional
interagency disaster preparedness committee. In addition, most hospitals reported having
provided at least some training to their personnel on identification and diagnosis of
disease caused by biological agents considered likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack,
such as anthrax or botulism‖ (GAO, Hospital 2003).
These reports are a cause for concern when dealing with response time and treatment.
Figure 1.4 below addresses what the staffing facility maintained:

Urban Hospitals with Medical Equipment Capabilities, per 100 Staffed Beds
(GAO, Hospital 2003)
Percentage of Hospitals
Ventilators
Less than 2

9%

2 to less than 5

33.9%

5 to less than 10 ventilators

39.7%

10 or more ventilators

17.4%
Total Percentage of Hospitals
100%

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) suits
Less than 2 PPE suits

38.2%
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2 to less than 5 PPE suits

24.8%

5 to less than 10 PPE suits

16.6%

10 or more PPE suits

20.3%
Total Percentage of Hospitals
100%

Isolation Beds
Less than 2 isolation beds

18.6%

2 to less than 5 isolation beds

47.3%

5 to less than 10 isolation beds

24.6%

10 or more isolation beds

9.5%
Total Percentage of Hospitals
100%

Number of Patients Per Hour Through 5 Minute Decontamination Shower
Less than 2 patients per hour

15.3%

2 to less than 5 patients per hour

25.8%

5 to less than 10 patients per hour

28.4%

10 or more patients per hour

30.5%
Total Percentage of Hospitals
100%

Almost ten years after this survey, there is still a concern as to whether hospitals have the
capacity to accommodate victims of CBRN attacks.
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USCG, DHS, & STAKEHOLDER RESPONSE,

Private stakeholders can only be effective if government agencies effectively provide
updated information to them. The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (NSPPCIKA) drafted by the White House
discusses challenges with guarding shipment cargos entering the United States. With
over three hundred seaports in the United States, it will take more than just the USCG
and DHS to secure the nation‘s assets. This report suggests that much of the seaport
areas represent a ―significant protection challenge, particularly in the case of high
consequence cargo. Physical and operational security guidelines have undergone a
comprehensive review, from which DoT and DHS will issue guidance and
recommendations for appropriate protective actions.‖

Agreements among international authorities such as the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) often provide support to the United States and help implement the
rules and practices U.S. agencies use in order to protect our waters. The Department of
Transportation (DOT) has recommended that there be ―guidelines for passenger vessel
and terminal security, including passenger and baggage screening and training of crews.
The industry requires R&D for cost-effective technologies for the rapid detection of
explosives and other hazardous substances, as well as for new vessel designs to minimize
the likelihood of a ship sinking if it were attacked‖ (National, 2008). The DOT and
USCG have initiated what is known was the Sea Marshal program and Maritime Safety
and Security Team to assist in assessing and securing vessels at sea and the seaports.
DOT has also participated with expediting ―compliance with international standards to
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enhance port, vessel and facility security. DOT is also working with U.S. Customs
Service to implement the Container Security Initiative to ensure the security of shipping
supply chain. Shipper who do not comply with outlined rules and regulations will be
subject to greater scrutiny and delays when entering U.S. ports‖ (National, 2008) DHS
and DOT have identified six initiatives to enhance maritime security. The six are
included in the figure below:
Figure 1.5 (National, 2008)
1. Identify vulnerabilities, interdependencies, best practices,
and remediation requirements
2. Develop a plan for implementing security measures
corresponding to varying threat levels
3. Develop processes to enhance maritime domain awareness
and gain international cooperation
4. Develop a template for improving physical and operational
port security
5. Develop security and protection guidelines and technologies
for cargo and passenger ships
6. Improve waterway security

Each initiative builds upon previous strategies drafted by the White House and through
Presidential Directives. The DHS and DOT have agreed to work closely in addressing
security assessments in order to identify the vulnerabilities, and to work with other
agencies involving ―appropriate federal departments and agencies, port security
committees, an private-sector owners and operators to develop or facilitate the
establishment of security plans to minimize security risks to ports, vessels, and other
maritime facilities‖ (National, 2008). Networking with other governmental agencies and
other stakeholders improves the physical security of this nation‘s maritime areas. With
regards to international maritime challenges, DHS and DOT will work with ―international
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maritime organizations and industry to study and develop appropriate guidelines and
technology requirements for the security of cargo and passenger ships‖ (National, 2008).
These initiatives help improve the safety and security of our nation‘s people and
infrastructure. The development of relationships with organizations within the United
States and abroad is critical to sustaining human life. The DHS, DOT, USCG and private
stakeholders including hospitals, port operators, and nuclear scientists must work together
in order to see change with the said initiatives.

Conclusion
The development of strategies, objectives, and goals are primarily depends on how the
U.S. government implements security measures. In order for us to maintain the safety of
our maritime infrastructure we must reach out to international organizations for
assistance. This is a global effort and an attack does not only have an effect on our ports
but it also affects those who live abroad. The United States‘ economy is intertwined with
the global economy. September 11th caused economic disaster resulting in a domino
effect of economic disasters around the world. We have to be careful, we have to be
vigilante, and we always have to be on our toes ready for anything. We may not be able
to predict an imminent attack, but we can certainly gain intelligence by being transparent
with stakeholders and government agencies. Public health affected by a possible
bioterrorist attack could result in mass casualties, irreparable structural damage, and
massive economic downfalls. We cannot sustain human life if we cannot sustain the
risks involved in understanding and maintaining the security of our maritime
infrastructure.
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CONCLUSION
At the end of this project one may conclude that there are a multitude of infrastructures at
risk. From a security standpoint there are still issues that clearly need to be addressed,
and there are several components of our infrastructures that need to be closely analyzed.
It is important to note that as years go by, technology gets more advanced, people get
smarter, and information will be more readily available. If sensitive information and
WMDs have fallen into the wrong hands, then we will have to do our best to foil an
attack before it happens. Should an attack occur, then we will have to mitigate the
effects. With innocent lives at risk there is no room for dismissive actions or political
agendas. Terrorists have been responsible for wreaking havoc and killing thousands of
lives. The lives lost in America and abroad are a direct result of terrorists able to fund,
train, and develop smarter ways to attack our soldiers and innocent civilians. We must
make it known to the terrorists that we have not become complacent and that our ties to
other countries are stronger than ever. The awareness amongst the public is stronger and
the assistance received by other agencies and other stakeholders has multiplied. Men and
women in the government solemnly swear to ―protect this country from all enemies both
foreign and domestic.‖ This has been apparent even within the general public who take it
upon themselves to notify authorities of suspicious activities. We are in this together, and
together we can combat terrorism. With that said I leave you with this: the question is
not if another attack will occur, but rather, when it does occur, will we be ready?

